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I INTRODUCTION
Liability insurance may be described as the means by which
one party (the "insured") purchases from one or more other par-
ties (the "insurers")financial protection in the form of defense and
indemnity against potential claims which all parties hope are
never actually filed.1 Thus, at the inception of the policy, the best
interests of the insured and the insurer are identical: each would
be best served if no claims were asserted against the insured dur-
ing the term of the policy. Once a claim has been asserted against
1. For a more detailed definition of "insurance," see R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw
§§ 1-2 (1971).
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the insured, however, there is a real possibility that the interests of
the insured and insurer may diverge. Thus, while both the insured
and the insurer would be best protected if the claim were defeated,
in the event this is not possible, the insured will usually be best
served by having the claim covered by and satisfied under the pol-
icy, whereas the insurer's interests usually would be better served
if the claim were beyond the coverage of the policy and satisfied by
the insured himself.2
This possible conflict between the interests of the insured and
the insurer, of course, may be exacerbated by a difference between
them as to whether a claim against the insured should be settled or
litigated to judgment. In fact, much of the case law dealing with
insurance issues in the last twenty-five years has evolved from sit-
uations in which the insured and insurer have been unable to
agree on whether a claim should be settled or litigated to judg-
ment. In addressing these disputes, the courts 3 and commenta-
tors4 have focused almost entirely on the rights of the insured and
the liabilities of the insurer and have virtually ignored the con-
verse issues of the rights of the insurer, either inter se or vis-a-vis
the insured, and the liabilities of the insured.
Two factors are repeatedly cited as justification for this empha-
sis on the rights of the insured and the liabilities of the insurer
(1) the vast disparity between the relative sophistication, bargain-
ing power, and economic strength of the insured and the insurer;5
and (2) the almost total control of the litigation which is vested in
the insurer by the terms of the policy, which typically empower the
insurer to settle or litigate claims in its discretion.6
Based upon these factors, the courts have developed two princi-
pal rules for the protection of the insured against the damage
which may result from the insurer's refusal to settle a claim which
the insured wants settled. First, in virtually every jurisdiction, the
insured is empowered to settle the litigation himself, either by ac-
tual payment to the claimant which the insured can recover from
2. The interests of the insured and insurer may be reversed where the insured
has a large deductible, self-insured retention, or participation. See sections
U.C. & MI.C. of the text infra.
3. See, e.g., Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d
9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975). For a discussion of this case, see
notes 159-66 & accompanying text infra.
4. See, e.g., 7C J. APIPLsmAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 4711-4715 (Berdal
ed. 1979).
5. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967) (court, in upholding excess liability of insurer, also awarded damages
for mental suffering caused to insured by company's bad faith).
6. See, e.g., Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621 (10th
Cir. 1942).
[Vol. 61:284
1982] RESOLUTION OF SETTLEMENT CONFLICTS 287
the insurer upon a showing that settlement was reasonable and
not collusive7 or by entering into a covenant not to execute, con-
sent to judgment, or loan receipt arrangement with the claimant
which limits the claimant's recovery to the proceeds of the insur-
ance policy.8 Most jurisdictions, however, limit this power to situa-
tions in which the insurer has disclaimed coverage and refused to
defend.9 Second, most jurisdictions will hold the insurer liable for
the entire amount of a judgment rendered against its insured,
without regard to policy limits, where such judgment followed a
wrongful refusal by the insurer to settle the claim within policy
limits.10 The standard for the imposition of such liability ranges
from negligence," to bad faith,12 and even approaches strict
liability.1 3
7. See id.
8. E.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 681 (Alaska 1980)
(consent to judgment binding on insurer); Globe Indem. Co. v. Blomfeld, 115
Ariz. 5, 562 P.2d 1372 (Ct. App. 1977) (under a covenant not to execute, the
insurer was liable after the covenant was rescinded); Hand v. Northwestern
Nat'l Ins. Co., 255 Ark. 802, 502 S.W.2d 474 (1973) (loan receipt arrangement in
settlement of claim not even brought to suit held binding on insurer).
9. Compare Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 63, 367 A.2d 864
(1976) (insured can settle claim and recover sums thus spent from insurer
who had refused to settle even though insurer was defending insured against
such claim) with Sargent v. Johnson, 551 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1977) (insured who
settled claim which was being defended by insurer in spite of dispute as to
amount of coverage breached policy and settlement was not binding on
insurer).
10. See Section II.A of the text infra. For a general review of the varying stan-
dards, see 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 4, §§ 4711-4713; Comment, Liability in
Excess of Insurance Policy Limits: Who Bears the Risk of Litigation?, 12 U.
ToL. L REV. 101 (1980) (author reviewed varying standards and urged that
Ohio adopt strict liability standard, a recommendation with which the au-
thors hereof do not concur, see notes 290-92 & accompanying text infra).
11. See Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. 94 N.L 484, 56 A.2d 57 (1941).
See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 116 N.H. 806, 373 A.2d 339 (1977)
(excess carrier could maintain action, assigned to it by insured, for primary
carrier's negligent failure to settle). In addition, the insured has been al-
lowed to proceed on alternative theories of negligence or bad faith. See, e.g.,
Bolinger v. Nuss, 202 Kan. 326, 449 P.2d 502 (1969).
12. It should be noted, however, that there is considerable difference among the
various jurisdictions as to what constitutes bad faith rendering the insurer
liable for the excess verdict. Compare Olson v. Union Fire Ins. Co., 174 Neb.
375, 118 N.W.2d 318 (1962) (mere mistake in judgment not equivalent to bad
faith) with Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal.
3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975) (insurer's "good faith" but mis-
taken belief that there was no coverage will not insulate it from excess
liability).
13. Compare Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,426 P.2d 173,58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967) (court discussed at length the benefits of a strict liability standard but
ultimately based its holding on the insurer's bad faith) and Johansen v. Cali-
fornia State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal.
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The vast majority of cases in which these rules developed have
arisen from fairly simple factual situations involving only one in-
sured, usually an individual, and one policy, usually an automobile
liability policy with a relatively nominal deductible and virtually
complete control of settlement vested in the insurer.14 Under such
circumstances, it is not surprising that the trend in the law has
been toward expanding both the insured's right to settle a claim
over the objection of the insurer, which may then be required to
fund the settlement up to the applicable limits of the policy, and
the insurer's liability for wrongful refusal to settle.15
Unfortunately, this simple fact pattern and the rules developed
under it are no longer adequate to cover all of the disputes which
may arise between and among insurers and insureds today. Due
in large part to the increasing needs for greater amounts of insur-
ance, the increased variety in the types of coverage available, and
the increased bargaining power of large commercial and profes-
sional insureds, an insured, itself consisting of myriad subsidiaries
and affiliates, may purchase several layers of insurance in varying
amounts from dozens, if not hundreds of insurers.16 Moreover,
these policies may give the insured significant control over the
handling and settlement of any litigation covered thereunder,
either by requiring the insured's consent to any settlement or by
vesting in the insured a significant financial involvement in the
claims asserted against it through such devices as a large deducti-
ble, self-insured retention, or participation in one or more layers of
coverage.I7
The possible permutations and combinations of potential con-
flict among the parties to such an insurance structure seem almost
infinite. Analysis of these potential conflicts in terms of the in-
creased exposure to which one party may be subjected by an-
Rptr. 288 (1975) (court noted argument for strict liability and fact that New
Jersey Supreme Court had adopted rule in Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inves-
tors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474,323 A.2d 495 (1974), but again nominally based
its holding on insurer's bad faith) with Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors
Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974) (interpreted by the California
Supreme Court as adopting strict liability standard) with Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 63, 367 A.2d 864 (1976) (New Jersey
Supreme Court rejected argument that Rova Farms established strict liabil-
ity as standard, but did not rule out possibility of future adoption).
14. See, e.g., Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d
9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975) and cases cited therein.
15. See notes 126-33 & accompanying text infra.
16. This complex picture does not even take into account the possibility that
each of these "direct" insurers, i.e., insurers having a direct contractual rela-
tionship with the insured, will in turn place part of the risk with reinsurers,
whose only contract will be with the direct insurer, not the insured.
17. See Section ILC. of the text infra.
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other's refusal to settle a claim against the insured reveals three
basic types of conflict which may arise during the course of settle-
ment negotiations:
(1) the insured, in order to avoid exposure beyond policy limits, wants
the claim settled but the insurer refuses to fund the proposed settlement;
(2) the excess carrier, in order to avoid increased exposure within its
limits, wants the claim against the insured settled but the primary carrier
refuses to contribute the sums necessary within its limits to fund the pro-
posed settlement; and
(3) the insurer with exposure above the settlement demand wants the
claim settled to eliminate such exposure but the insured refuses to post
the sums necessary within its deductible, self-insured retention, or partic
ipation to fund the proposed settlement.18
Not every settlement dispute, however, will necessitate litiga-
tion between the parties to resolve their respective rights and lia-
bilities. Rather, a failure to effect settlement because of a dispute
may be followed by a verdict or other determination in the third
party litigation either in favor of the insured or, if adverse to the
insured, for an amount less than the proposed settlement figure.19
In either event, of course, the failure to settle has not caused any
real damage and no further litigation would be required between
or among insured and insurers.
However, in two situations, a dispute over settlement may re-
quire litigation to establish the rights and liabilities of the insured
and insurers:
(1) where the party desiring settlement enters into a settlement agree-
ment with the claimant and then attempts to force the party who refused
to settle to bear the same financial burden as would have been required of
him under the policy provisions had he consented to the settlement, and
(2) where the claim against the insured is not settled and results in a
verdict against the insured in an amount higher than that for which the
claim could have been settled and the party who wanted to settle seeks to
have this excess amount paid, not in strict accordance with policy provi-
sions and limits, but entirely by the party who refused to settle.
This Article will examine the current state of the law concern-
ing the relative rights and liabilities of the insured, primary in-
surer, and excess insurers in these types of settlement disputes
18. Of course, there are other types of conflicts. For example, a dispute may
arise when the insured and the excess carrier wish to settle the claim and the
primary carrier refuses to post its limits. In most respects, other disputes are
basically combinations of or minor variations from the three basic types of
conflicts listed in the text and do not require detailed separate analysis. Any
significant legal difference in the less basic types of conflicts will be noted in
the discussion which follows.
19. For a more detailed catalog of the possible results of a failure to settle, see
the dissenting opinion in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 72 N.J.
63, 367 A.2d 864 (1976) (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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and suggest appropriate guidelines for the resolution of such is-
sues in the future.
II. THE RIGHT OF ONE PARTY TO A SETTLEMENT
DISPUTE TO SETTLE OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF
THE OTHER AND OBTAIN FINANCIAL
CONTRIBUTION FROM THE OBJECTOR:
SEEKING REFUGE BEFORE THE STORM
In the event the parties are unable to resolve their dispute over
whether a claim against the insured should be settled, they may
choose 'to simply let the claim go to verdict on the chance that a
verdict may be in favor of the insured or, if adverse to the insured,
may be in an amount less than the settlement demand. Such a
gamble obviously involves the risk that the verdict may be adverse
to the insured or in an amount far greater than the settlement de-
mand. When an excess verdict results, the effort to establish the
liability of the party who blocked settlement has been aptly lik-
ened to "seek[ing] shelter after the storm" 20 and will be examined
in a succeeding section of this Article. This section will examine
the related issue of whether the party who desires settlement of
the claim against the insured may eliminate the possibility of an
adverse verdict in excess of the settlement demand and, in effect,
"seek shelter before the storm," by settling the claim and then forc-
ing the party who opposed settlement to fund its share thereof in
accordance with the terms of its policy as though it had consented
to the settlement.
A. Insured's Right to Settle the Claim and Force the Objecting Carrier
to Pay its Share of the Settlement
As a practical matter, and because it is in their best interests to
do so, most insurers will settle a case within policy limits where it
appears that the insured's liability in the event of an adverse ver-
dict will exceed the amount for which the case may be settled.
This is especially true where such liability may exceed policy lim-
its. Where an insurer refuses to post all or part of its limits to set-
tle a case, however, the insured confronts two obstacles in his
efforts to settle the case with the third party claimant and force the
insurer to bear its share of such settlement:
(1) Policy language. Virtually every policy contains three
clauses which pose formidable obstacles to any effort by the in-
sured to force the carrier to fund a settlement arranged by the in-
sured over the insurer's objections: (a) the defense clause, which
20. Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621, 627 (10th Cir.
1942).
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vests almost total discretion over settlement decisions in the in-
surer, typically providing that "'the company may make such in-
vestigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as it
deems expedient' ,;21 (b) the cooperation clause, which is much
broader than its name suggests requiring not only that the insured
"'assist... in the conduct of suits,' ,2 but also proscribing volun-
tary payments by the insured, typically by providing that "'the in-
sured shall not, except at his own cost, voluntarily make any
payment, assume any obligation or incur any expense' ,';23 and
(c) the no-action clause, which typically precludes any action by
the insured against the insurer "'until after full compliance with
all the terms of [the] policy [or] until the amount of the insured's
obligation to pay shall have been finally determined either by judg-
ment against the insured after actual trial or by written agreement
of the insured, the claimant and [the insurer].' ",24
(2) Financial ability. The amount required to settle most
claims is usually beyond the ability of the insured to pay immedi-
ately, and the claimant is usually unwilling or unable to accept a
long term payout.25
The attitude expressed in early cases toward attempts by the
insured to get around these obstacles is reflected in the following
language of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in C. Schmidt & Sons
Brewing Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co.:26
The rights of the parties are to be determined by the agreement into which
they entered. By the provisions of the policy the insurance company was
obliged to defend at its own cost any action against the insured, and the
entire management of the defense was expressly intrusted to it, and the
insured was forbidden to settle any claim, or to interefere in any negotia-
tions for settlement, or in any legal proceeding against it. The insurer was
under no obligation to pay in advance of trial, and the decision whether to
settle or to try was committed to it. The plain words of the policy have no
other meaning.27
A review of the more modem case law reveals, however, that
these obstacles are no longer viewed as insurmountable and that,
in appropriate circumstances and under varying standards, the
courts will force an insurer to pay its share of a settlement entered
21. Sargent v. Johnson, 551 F.2d 221, 230 n.12 (8th Cir. 1977) (quoting policy at
issue).
22. Taylor v. Safeco Ins. Co., 361 So. 2d 743,745 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (quoting
policy at issue).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Hoagland Wagon Co. v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 202 Mo.
App. 490, 212 S.W. 393 (1919) (insured forced into corporate dissolution by
insurer's refusal to indemnify).
26. 244 Pa. 286, 90 A. 653 (1914).
27. Id. at 287, 90 A. at 654.
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into between the insured and the claimant, even where such settle-
ment not only is over the insurer's objections but also has been
specifically arranged to shift the ultimate financial obligation to the
insurer.
1. Insurer's Refusal to Defend as Empowering the Insured to
Settle
In the typical liability policy, both the insurer's duty to defend
and its control over settlement are set forth in the same provision:
"As respects the insurance afforded by the other terms of this policy the
company shall:
(a) defend any proceeding against the insured seeking such benefits in
any suit against the insured alleging such injury and seeking damages on
account thereof, even if such proceeding or suit is groundless, false or
fraudulent; but the company may make such investigation, negotiation and
settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient... 
,,28
Inasmuch as the insurer's power to control settlements arises
from its duty to defend claims, it is not surprising to find universal
recognition of the principle that abandonment by the insurer of the
duty to defend will deprive it of control over settlements and em-
power the insured to enter into settlements which may bind the
insurer in certain circumstances. 29 Indeed, this rule was suc-
cinctly set forth almost forty years ago in Traders & General Insur-
ance Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co.:30
It is well settled that if the potential loss is within the limits and coverage
of the policy and the insurer accepts liability therefor, by agreeing to de-
fend the claims or suits against its assured, and to pay the losses when
established, the insurer is accorded the absolute control of the litigation.
It may elect to compromise and settle the claims before suit is filed or
after, or it may elect to defend in the name of the assured, and the exer-
cise of its discretion is not subject to challenge of the assured. The as-
sured may not do more than cooperate with the insurer in the defense of
the claim or suit. . . . If, however, the insurer denies liability for the as-
serted claims and refuses to defend in the name of the assured or to ac-
knowledge any duty or obligation arising under the contract of insurance,
the assured is released from the covenant against settlement or interfer-
ence and may assume control of the litigation, defend in his own name, or
effect a reasonable and prudent settlement of the claims, or suits, and
thereafter assert his rights under the policy in which event, his right to
28. Sargent v. Johnson, 551 F.2d 221, 230 n.12 (8th Cir. 1977) (quoting policy at
issue).
29. See Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621 (10th Cir.
1942) and cases cited therein.
30. 129 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1942). Although the issue rarely arises, it should be
noted that there are cases which hold that an insured and his primary carrier
have the right to settle with the third party claimant and leave the excess
carrier who has refused to settle or participate in defense open to further
liability. See Elas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 39 l]l. App. 3d 944, 352
N.E.2d 60 (1976); Deblon v. Beaton, 103 N.J. Super. 345, 247 A.2d 172 (1968).
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recover against the insurer is generally measured by the coverage under
the policy and the reasonableness of the settlement.3 1
Although in the past forty years there has been substantial ero-
sion of the unfettered discretion of the insurer to settle or litigate,
especially in the development of liability for an excess verdict fol-
lowing wrongful refusal to settle,32 the rules stated above in Trad-
ers & General prevail in the majority of jurisdictions today.3 3 Two
important points of clarification must be noted, however. First,
transfer of the power to settle the litigation to the insured does not
require an absolute refusal to defend by the insurer and cannot be
avoided by the insurer simply by failing to do anything in response
to a notice of claim. Rather, the insurer is required to act promptly
in response to a notice of claim. Failure to respond may be re-
garded as a disclaimer of coverage and refusal to defend, entitling
the insured to effect a settlement and seek reimbursement from
the insurer. This point was made in Hand v. Northwestern Na-
tional Insurance Co.,34 in which the court upheld the insured's
right to settle a claim prior to suit where the insured notified his
insurer of a potential claim for which he believed he was liable,
and the insurer responded only by advising the insured that he
had no liability and should institute suit to vindicate that position.
The second point of clarification is that the mere refusal of an
insurer to defend does not vest the insured with an absolute right
to enter into a settlement with the claimant which will be binding
on the insurer. For the insured to shift the burden of funding the
settlement to the insurer, he must establish that the settlement
was reasonable and not collusive,3 5 and that the claim settled was
covered under the insurer's policy.36 Even if both of these points
are established by the insured, the insurer's liability will normally
be no greater than its policy limits3 7 and any costs incurred by the
insured in defense and settlement of the claim.38 In some cases,
however, the insured also has been allowed to recover his costs
31. 129 F.2d at 626.
32. See Sections lILA & IOLB. of the text infra.
33. See 7C J. APPLEAN, supra note 4, §§ 4712-4715.
34. 255 Ark. 802, 502 S.W.2d 474 (1973). However, the insurer must be given some
reasonable opportunity to act upon the claim. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Hughes,
317 F. Supp. 928 (WD. Va. 1970) (settlement reached before insurer even no-
tified of claim not binding on insurer).
35. See, e.g., First Natl Indem. Co. v. Mercado, 511 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974).
36. Id.
37. See Elas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 39 Ill. App. 3d 944, 352 N.E.2d 60
(1976).
38. See, e.g., Alderman v. Hanover Ins. Group, 169 Conn. 603, 363 A.2d 1102 (1975).
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and attorney's fees in the action against his insurer.39
2. Insurer's Bad Faith as Determinant of the Insured's Power
to Settle
Although there is universal agreement that an insurer's dis-
claimer of coverage coupled with a refusal to defend will empower
the insured to effect a settlement which may be binding on the in-
surer, there is a split of authority as to what conduct, if any,40 will
give such power to an insured who is offered a defense by the in-
surer. In some jurisdictions, an insured who is offered a condi-
tional defense may reject such defense and effect a settlement
which will be binding on the insurer, at least up to its limits, upon
a showing that the settlement was reasonable and the claim was
covered.4 1 In other jurisdictions, however, if the insurer offers a
conditional defense, the insured will not be able to effect a settle-
ment which is binding on the insurer unless he can establish that
the settlement was reasonable, that the claim was covered, and
that the insurer was acting in bad faith in its defense and/or re-
fusal to settle. This rule is perhaps best illustrated by a compari-
son of the landmark case of Traders & General Insurance Co. v.
Rudco Oil & Gas Co.,42 in which the bad faith exception was most
clearly delineated, with Sargent v. Johnson,43 decided thirty-five
years later by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In Traders & General, the insured, Rudco, purchased a liability
insurance policy from Traders & General which had bodily injury
limits of $5,000 per person and $10,000 per accident. During the
term of the policy, a claim for $63,000 was filed against Rudco by
Carl H. Nelson and several members of his family as a result of an
explosion which destroyed the house in which the family lived,
killing some family members and injuring others. Although the
Nelsons owned the house, Rudco held an oil and gas lease on the
land by assignment from the Carter Oil Company, which retained
the surface rights to the land. The explosion apparently resulted
from a defect in a gas line system used by Rudco to fuel the en-
gines which pumped oil from the wells. Upon notification of the
claim, Traders & General denied coverage on the grounds that the
injuries were incurred away from or off the premises owned by
39. See, e.g., Otteman v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 172 Neb. 574, 111 N.W.2d 97
(1961).
40. Some jurisdictions will not allow an insured to settle a claim against which he
is being defended by the insurer, even under a conditional defense. See, e.g.,
Sargent v. Johnson, 551 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1977). Whether such rule would
obtain if the defense were being conducted in bad faith is unclear.
41. See notes 66-84 & accompanying text infra.
42. 129 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1942).
43. 551 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1977).
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Rudco and arose from the delivery, sale, or distribution of natural
gas.
Following this disclaimer, Traders & General and Rudco en-
tered into a non-waiver agreement which provided that Traders &
General would defend Rudco but that such defense would not be
regarded as a waiver by Traders & General of its disclaimer.
Shortly thereafter, Traders & General instituted a declaratory
judgment action against both Rudco and the Nelsons. Traders &
General refused Rudco's request that it refrain from pressing the
declaratory judgment action until after the personal injury actions
were tried and settled, stating it would refrain only if Rudco agreed
to pay certain attorney's fees incurred in defense of the personal
injury claims in the event that Traders & General's non-coverage
position was vindicated.
Rudco was convinced it would be legally liable in the personal
injury actions and "morally certain"44 that the anticipated adverse
verdict therein would far exceed the policy limits. With the full
knowledge of Traders & General, Rudco obtained a settlement de-
mand from the Nelsons of $17,000 and an offer of Carter Oil Com-
pany to contribute one-half thereof. Rudco then demanded that
Traders & General agree to the settlement and contribute to it,
with the ultimate burden of funding the settlement to be decided
in the declaratory judgment action. Traders & General refused, but
offered "purely as a matter of policy"45 to contribute $2,000 to any
settlement made. Following several more unsuccessful attempts
to persuade Traders & General to participate in the settlement,
Rudco effected settlement on its own and thereafter sued Traders
& General to recover the settlement amount.
The trial court found that the claims were covered under the
policy, that the settlement amount was reasonable, and that Trad-
ers & General acted in bad faith toward its insured in the handling
and settlement of the Nelsons' claims and in filing and pressing the
suit for declaratory judgment. Thus, Traders & General was es-
topped from invoking the policy provision against voluntary settle-
ment. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment in a well-reasoned
opinion clearly setting forth the limited circumstances in which an
insured can settle a claim over its insurer's objections.
After reviewing the general rule vesting complete control of the
defense and settlement of claims in the insurer and the exception
allowing the insured to settle where the insurer has refused to de-
fend, the court noted other exceptions to the rule:
The rule is again modified if the loss asserted against the assured exceeds
44. Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir.
1942).
45. Id. at 624.
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the limits of the policy, liability for which is admitted by the insurer to the
extent of the policy limits. In these circumstances, both the insured and
the insurer have a pecuniary interest in the ultimate liability to the third
party and each of them become vested with the right to protect that inter-
est, commensurate with the extent of its potential liability....
Where, as here, each has a potential liability, the insurer is obligated
by contract to defend the suits or claims in the name of assured and to pay
the losses incurred to the extent of the limits of its policy. Its obligation to
defend and to pay is primary and paramount; consequently, its right to
control the litigation is first and paramount, an essential part of which is
the right to insist upon the cooperation of the assured, and the assured
may not interfere by voluntary assumption of liability or by arbitrarily in-
sisting upon settlement of the claims or suits. But,.the rights of the in-
surer in these circumstances are not absolute, they are subject to
moderation by the rule of right and justice. Exclusive authority to act
does not necessarily mean the right to act arbitrarily ... The right to
control the litigation in all of its aspects carries with it the correlative duty
to exercise diligence, intelligence, good faith, honest and conscientious
fidelity to the common interest of the parties .... When the insurer un-
dertakes the defense of the claim or suit, it acts as the agent of its assured
in virtue of the contract of insurance between the parties, and when a con-
flict of interest arises between the insurer, as agent, and assured, as prin-
cipal, the insurer's conduct will be subject to closer scrutiny than that of
the ordinary agent, because of his adverse interest.4 6
The court then reviewed the varying standards in different ju-
risdictions for imposition of excess liability on insurers for failure
to settle a claim against the insured. The court noted a key distinc-
tion between cases where the insured waited for the final outcome
before asserting his rights under the policy, and the matter before
it, but nonetheless extended the bad faith rationale to uphold
Rudco's right to settle the claim and force Traders & General to
fund the settlement. The court stated:
We think, however, the rule applies with equal force to a prudent settle-
ment made by the assured in the face of a potential judgment far in excess
of the limits of the policy. Why should the assured be required to wait
until after the storm before seeking refuge.
[Blefore Traders & General may interpose the voluntary settlement
made by Rudco as a bar to recovery upon the policy, it must be shown that
it acted, not alone in furtherance of its own interest, but it must also ap-
pear that it acted in good faith and dealt fairly with the assured. Its mani-
fest attitude and course of conduct must have some legal justification and
factual basis.4 7
Although the court acknowledged the right of Traders & Gen-
eral to adjudicate its liability under the policy, it agreed with the
trial court that the insurer's filing of the declaratory judgment ac-
tion, pressing same over the objections of the insured, and refusing
to participate in the settlement, subject to reallocation of the bur-
den of funding in accordance with the outcome of the declaratory
46. Id. at 626.
47. Id. at 627-28.
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judgment action, was clear evidence of bad faith. While recogniz-
ing "the evils inherent in any rule which permits, or justifies, a
compromise or settlement by the assured without the consent of
the insurer,"40 the court found that such bad faith was sufficient to
justify an exception to the rule that a voluntary settlement by the
insured will not be binding on the insurer.
The limitations imposed on the bad faith exception to the rule
that the insurer has control over settlement are perhaps best illus-
trated by the decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Sargent v. Johnson.49 In that case, the insured, Preston Haglin
Company, was joined as a third-party defendant in an action
brought by one of its employees, Paul F. Sargent, as a result of a
construction accident. It was joined by the defendant architect
and a subcontractor on theories of contribution and indemnity for
failing to provide a safe place for the employee to work and con-
tractual indemnity. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company insured
Haglin with limits of $100,000 for employers' liability and $500,000
for comprehensive general liability, including contractual indem-
nity but excluding coverage for claims arising out of injury to Hag-
lin's employees.
Liberty provided a defense in the action but notified Haglin that
its liability was limited to $100,000 with respect to the indemnity
claim for failure to provide a safe place to work and $500,000 with
respect to the architect's contractual indemnity claim. Liberty fur-
ther advised Haglin that its coverage might not apply to the con-
tractual indemnity claim because such claim appeared to arise out
of the architect's professional duties, including supervision and in-
spection, which type of claim was specifically excluded under the
Liberty policy. Following this notification, Haglin instituted a
fourth-party claim against Liberty, alleging, among other things,
that Liberty should be liable for up to $2 million of any third-party
claims against Haglin because Liberty had negligently failed to
recommend that Haglin purchase insurance in such amount.
At the trial of the personal injury action, in which Haglin was
defended by counsel Liberty selected, the trial judge directed a
verdict in favor of plaintiff and against defendants and third-party
defendant, leaving to the jury assessment of damages and appor-
tiomnent of liability. The jury entered an award of $1.6 million in
favor of the plaintiff and apportioned Haglin's liability at 30%.
Haglin then dismissed its counsel and entered into a settlement
agreement which provided that Haglin would pay $700,000 plus in-
terest as its share of the damage award and that these sums would
48. Id. at 628.
49. 551 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1977).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
only be paid from the proceeds of Haglin's insurance policy with
Liberty. The district court formally approved the settlement
agreement and entered a judgment accordingly. In addition, the
district court entered judgment on the fourth-party action, holding
Liberty liable for the sums agreed to by Haglin.
Liberty appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
framed the central issues as follows:
[D]oes a liability insurer which is affording its insured a defense to a
pending action for damages breach its contract of insurance by disputing
with its insured the amount of coverage that is available for the claim?
The converse of the question is whether or not an insured, disputing the
amount of coverage with its insurer, breaches the defense and settlement
provisions of the policy, the assistance and cooperation provisions of the
policy and the "no action" clause of the policy, by unilaterally discharging
the insurer's attorney defending the case and thereafter entering into a
settlement with the claimant.5 0
In resolving these issues, the court focused on the dual nature
of the insurer's undertakings in its policy: the duty to defend and
the duty to pay or settle. The court found that Liberty was provid-
ing a defense for Haglin.51 In regard to the duty to pay or settle,
the court found that "[b]ecause the time for Liberty's payment
performance had not been reached through a final judgment or a
demand for settlement within policy limits[,] Liberty had not
breached any policy obligation to its insured, whether the coverage
was $100,000, $500,000, or $2,500,000."52
The court distinguished all the cases Haglin relied upon to sup-
port its contention that Liberty breached its insurance contract by
failing to accede to Haglin's demands for additional coverage. It
noted that all of the cases in which an insured had been allowed to
settle involved either the insurer's refusal to defend or its denial of
all liability, neither of which were present in the case before it. 53
The court then stated:
The theory of the appellees would stand insurance law on its head by re-
quiring an insurance carrier to perform under the terms of a contract not
in writing and not yet determined to exist.... Here, the demand of the
insured was for additional coverage which the insurance company at that
point was not obligated to provide by any contract, by any judicial deci-
sion, or otherwise. Under these circumstances, the obligations of the in-
surer must be measured by the then-established insurance coverages.54
The court concluded that the insured was guilty of bad faith,
which effectively severed the insurer-insured relationship and re-
lieved the insurer of its duty to pay under the policy:
50. Id. at 230.
51. Id. at 231.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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[The] standard of good faith and mutual respect applies to both parties to
the insurance contract. In this case, under the circumstances previously
related, we must conclude that the insured's conduct in discharging de-
fense counsel provided by the insurance carrier and entering into a settle-
ment of the pending litigation without the insurer's consent even with
court approval, constituted a violation of terms of the existing policies.
Moreover, the insured not only breached its contract, but acted in bad
faith. Counsel for the insured did not enter into a bargain to settle its
liability claims for a fair price, but entered into a questionable collabora-
tion by which the parties maneuvered through terms of a settlement
agreement to impose an uncompromised full balance of a judgment upon
the insurer, while the insured incurred no real detriment. In light of the
questionable validity of the judgment on its face, and the substantial sum
obtained outright by Sargent from [defendant] Ohman, this seems partic-
ularly unreasonable. This kind of bargain represents the antithesis of mu-
tual respect for rights.
5 5
The potential for abuse of the bad faith exception to the rule
that the control over settlement is vested in the insurer, which was
vaguely foreshadowed in the reluctant nature of the court's hold-
ing in Traders & General and formed the basis for the court's hold-
ing in Sargent v. Johnson, was discussed at length by Justice
Clifford of the New Jersey Supreme Court in a dissenting opinion
in Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Security Insurance Co.56 In
Fireman's Fund, the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld, by a vote
of four to three, a lower court ruling that Security Insurance Com-
pany, the primary carrier, was obligated to pay its full primary lim-
its of $50,000 toward a $135,000 settlement which had been arranged
by its insured and the insured's excess carrier, Fireman's Fund.
The primary carrier had refused to approve that settlement in
spite of a request by the insured and the recommendation of both
the trial attorney and the excess carrier that it do so.
The majority based the right of the insured to arrange the set-
tlement squarely on the bad faith of Security as the primary car-
rier. The court held that the insurer's breach of its implied
covenant to exercise good faith in considering a settlement in ex-
cess of its policy limits allowed the insured "to protect his own in-
terest in minimizing a potential liability in excess of the policy
limits by agreeing to a reasonable good faith settlement of the neg-
ligence actions and then, on proof of the insurer's default, to re-
55. Id. at 232.
56. 72 N.J. 63, 367 A.2d 864 (1976). It should be noted that, in Fireman's Fund, the
excess insurer, Fireman's Fund, actually assisted in the payment of the set-
tlement and then, as assignee of the insured, brought the action against the
primary insurer. The opinion made clear, however, that the insured's rights,
not the excess insurer's rights, were at issue: '"he parties agree that plain-
tiff's status is no different than that of the insured and that no additional
rights flow to it because it was an excess insurer." Id. at 68 n.1, 367 A.2d at 866
n.l.
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cover from it the amount of its policy limits." 57
However, the majority limited the right of the insured to settle
over the objections of the insurer to those situations in which the
insurer was acting in bad faith and the potential loss exceeded the
the recalcitrant insurer's policy limits.5 8 Where the potential loss
was within policy limits, the insured had no right to settle even
though it believed the insurer was acting in bad faith; the sole re-
course was to await the verdict and then sue the insurer for the
amount, if any, by which the verdict exceeded the settlement
demand.59
Justice Clifford vigorously dissented on grounds of "both sound
public policy and the efficient operation of the liability industry"60
to empowering the insured to settle claims in the absence of a
breach of an express provision of the policy and thereafter recover
from the insurer the full amount of the policy. He pointed out a
significant difference between the breach of the implied duty of
good faith and breach of the express duties to defend or indemnify
[W] hen an insurer refuses to defend, substantial damage is almost certain
to result unless the assured acts, while if the insurer defends but merely
decides to gamble by not settling, his gamble may pay off in a judgment
for the insured at trial. In the latter situation, then, the insured receives
protection under existing law: if the gamble was unreasonable and loses,
the insurer and not the insured is liable for any excess. If the gamble
wins, both are absolved from liability.6 1
Justice Clifford noted that the insurer's right to gamble, with
full acceptance of the consequences, was destroyed by plaintiff's
decision to settle, which eliminated any possibility that the claim
would result in a verdict favorable to the insured or at least in a
verdict less than the amount of settlement.62 The insured's precip-
itous settlement was criticized as turning a potential risk, which
could have ranged from zero to an amount in excess of policy lim-
its, to a certain loss of the primary limits.
The dissent cited public policy and sound business reasons for
favoring control over settlement by the insurer.
In order for an insurance carrier effectively to discharge its duty to defend,
its control over the negotiation and litigation must be complete, not under-
cut by the separate undertakings of the insured. By purchasing insur-
ance, the insured acquires the expertise and competence of the carrier in
claims proceedings. This in turn necessitates a turning over of complete
57. Id. at 72-73, 367 A.2d at 869.
58. Id. at 75-76, 367 A.2d at 870-71.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 79, 367 A.2d at 873 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 82, 367 A.2d at 875 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (citing IL Keeton, Liability
Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L REv. 1136, 1162
(1954)).
62. Id. at 85-86, 367 A.2d at 877.(Clifford, J., dissenting).
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control to the insurer. Likewise, the insured is under the obligation to co-
operate with the insurer, and to refrain from negotiating independently.
"Giving the insured the power to control the settlement of his own case
would raise the possibility that the insured, inexperienced in evaluating
claims and desiring to avoid potential excess liability, would settle in
cases in which litigation would result in no liability." Note, 41 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 120, 126 (1968). The efficient disposition of claims dictates that the
one party with the expertise, the carrier, be in sole control If it be other-
wise, there is created the risk of claimants playing off the insurer against
the insured, holding out for the higher stakes the insured will pay if the
insurer does not because of the threat of excess liability. The adverse cost
effects would of course end up being borne by the insured public.63
The dissent also noted that the majority decision was anoma-
lous in that, as a supposed extension of the insurer's duty of good
faith and fair dealing, it deprived the insurer of the very exclusive
control over settlements which gave rise to that duty.64
Justice Clifford concluded with a sharp criticism of the majority
decision: "I see today's decision as fraught with the potentiality
for mischievious consequences, as an unwarranted intrusion upon
the insurance carrier's contracted-for right to control- its own
destiny, and as contrary to established law and sound public
policy."65
This warning by Justice Clifford aptly summarizes the potential
problems with the bad faith exception to the general rule vesting
complete control over settlements in the insurer. Although, as
pointed out in Traders & General, the exception seems to afford
greater protection to the insured by allowing it to reduce its expo-
sure through settlement in spite of the insurer's objections, a seri-
ous question remains as to whether such seeming additional
protection is real or warranted. On balance, it is clear that the bad
faith exception does not provide any real additional protection to
the insured. Rather, such protection of the insured is already pro-
vided by the now well-established body of case law holding that
liability for the entire amount of an excess verdict will be imposed
upon an insurer who has acted in bad faith in refusing to settle.
This does not mean, however, that the bad faith exception has no
impact upon the relationship between the insured and insurer.
Rather, as pointed out in Sargent and in Justice Clifford's dissent
in Fireman's Fund, the bad faith exception virtually turns that re-
lationship upside down, stripping the insurer of its control over
settlements and placing such power in the hands of the insured.
63. Id. at 84, 367 A.2d at 876 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 87, 367 A.2d at 877 (Clifford, J. dissenting). The bad faith exception was
also applied by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Home Indem. Co. v.
Snowden, 223 Ark. 64,264 S.W.2d 642 (1954) and provoked an equally critical
dissent by Justice Robinson.
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Any new rule of law, such as the bad faith exception, which drasti-
cally reduces the contractual rights of the insurer without any real
increase in the protection afforded to the insured is, we submit,
subject to severe criticism and should be applied sparingly, if at
all.
3. Insurer's Conditional Defense as Empowering the Insured
to Settle
In the cases thus far examined, the insurer will be deprived of
its exclusive control over settlement only upon a showing of some
culpable conduct on its part, either in the form of wrongful refusal
to defend or undue delay in investigating and defending, or in the
form of bad faith refusal to settle. Some jurisdictions, however, de-
prive the insurer of its control over settlement without any show-
ing of wrongdoing, by allowing an insured who has been offered a
conditional defense to reject such defense and assume control over
the defense and settlement of the litigation. This rule was stated
more than sixty years ago by the Kansas City (Missouri) Court of
Appeals in Rieger v. London Guarantee & Accident Co. 66 In that
case, Rieger, the insured, was sued for injuries to an employee,
Miss Miller, and was initially defended by its insurer, London
Guarantee & Accident Company. During the course of the litiga-
tion, however, a dispute arose as to whether Miss Miller was within
the category of employees insured under the policy, and London
disclaimed liability. The insured then demanded that the com-
pany either admit liability under the policy or turn over control of
his defense to him. This demand was rejected and the counsel se-
lected by the insurer withdrew their appearance. Advised by his
own attorneys of the probability of an adverse judgment against
him, the insured settled the suit and instituted an action to recover
the settlement amount from his insurers.
The court of appeals, reversing the trial court's grant of a de-
murrer in favor of the insurer, specifically rejected the insurer's
contentions that the insured's demand for an unconditional de-
fense, which allegedly forced the insurer's attorneys to withdraw,
breached the policy and that the insurer was not liable for the set-
tlement because it was a voluntary payment by the insured in con-
travention of the policy terms. The court statedh
Nor did plaintiff [insured] force defendant [insurer] from the further de-
fense of the Miller suit and thereby disable the plaintiff to claim against it
the payments made in settlement of the Miller suit. The answer pleaded
that such payments were voluntary. The facts show that they clearly were
not. Besides, the company had breached its contract, and, under these
circumstances, the insured had the right to, in good faith, make the best
66. 202 Mo. App. 184, 215 S.W. 920 (1919).
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compromise he could and is not bound to submit to an adverse judg-
ment... In addition to this, the evidence does not show that defendant
was forced out of the defense. It had been allowed to take charge and had
continued therein, under the idea that it was doing so in recognition of its
liability under the policy. It was only for that reason that plaintiff surren-
dered his right to control his defense in his own way and through his attor-
neys. This is an important right; one that plaintiff could not be expected to
surrender to the insurance company if there was no liability upon it in-
volved in the outcome of the suit defended, in order to spur them on to do
their best. The plaintiff had the right to insist that, if the company was not
going to recognize his liability under the policy, it had no right to control
his defense, which right they could claim only by virtue of that policy.
6 7
The rationale underlying the conditional defense exception to
the insurer's exclusive control over settlement was clearly set
forth by the Florida District Court of Appeal in Taylor v. Safeco
Insurance Co.68 In that case, Earl Taylor was driving a car owned
by Robert Henry, Safeco's named insured, when it was involved in
an accident which killed Earl's brother, William, who was a pas-
senger. William's widow then sued Earl Taylor and joined Safeco,
which undertook his defense but pleaded non-coverage in its own
defense to the widow's claim. After obtaining summary judgment
declaring that Earl was not an insured under its policy because he
did not have the owner's permission to drive the car at the time of
the accident, Safeco withdrew its conditional defense. Earl thereu-
pon filed a notice of appeal and Safeco again offered to defend him,
subject to a reservation of its right to contest coverage. Earl re-
fused this tender of a conditional defense and proceeded to negoti-
ate a $730,000 settlement with the widow and her attorney. This
settlement was formalized by the entry of a consent judgment.
The court of appeal reversed Safeco's summary judgment and
remanded the coverage issue for trial.69 The widow, as assignee of
the unsatisfied consent judgment, filed a separate action against
Safeco. A consolidated trial of both the coverage issue and the ac-
tion to recover the judgment resulted in summary judgment for
Safeco on the grounds that Safeco was released from any coverage
by Earl's action in refusing the "re-tendered conditional defense
and settling the widow's claim. This ruling was in turn reversed
and remanded by the Florida District Court of Appeal,7o in an opin-
ion which explored the reasons for, and limits to, the conditional
67. Id. at 211, 215 S.W. at 930.
68. 361 So. 2d 743 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). See also Evans v. Continental Cas.
Co., 40 Wash. 614, 245 P.2d 470 (1952) (court allowed recovery by insured of
amounts paid by him in settlement but limited such recovery to a reasonable
amount within policy limits).
69. Taylor v. Safeco Ins. Co., 324 So. 2d 645 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
70. Taylor v. Safeco Ins. Co., 361 So. 2d 743 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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defense exception to the exclusive control of the insurer over
settlement.
At the outset of its opinion, the court conceded the validity of
reservation of rights agreements but noted that they were merely
permissive and not mandatory:
Safeco was entitled to [defend under Reservation of Rights Agreement]
for the law distinguishes between the insurer's duties to defend and to
pay... and does not forbid agreement between insurer and a putative
insured which resolves the urgent question of who shall defend and
postpones resolution of the contingent question of who shall pay any
judgment.
Similarly, Earl Taylor was not obliged to surrender control of his per-
sonal defense to an insurer which disclaimed responsibility for any judg-
ment within the policy limits that might result from the litigation.
Without affecting the question of Safeco's liability to pay any judgment
within policy limits, Earl was privileged at the outset to deny Safeco con-
trol of his defense which is exemplifiedby Safeco's selection and payment
of a lawyer to represent Earl. Just as the insurer is not required to aban-
don its contest of a duty to pay as a condition of fulfilling an assumed or
admitted duty to defend, the insured is not required to abandon control of
his own defense as the price of preserving his claim, disputed by the in-
surer, that the insurer pay any judgment. The law respects, but does not
require, such agreements.
7 1
Nowhere in its opinion did the court even suggest that the in-
surer was acting in bad faith in its refusal to defend Earl without
reservation of its rights to disclaim coverage. Rather, the court la-
beled Safeco's reservation of rights position "legitimate" but none-
theless held that such a reservation shifted to the insured the
power to defend and settle the claim.72 The court extended the
insured's right to settle claims beyond cases involving the in-
surer's unjustified refusal to defend to situations where, "as a re-
sult of the parties' failure to agree upon a conditional defense, the
putative insured chooses to control the litigation and to effect a
reasonable settlement."73
The appellate court, however, refused to enter judgment
against Safeco for the full amount of the settlement. Rather, it
held that the issues of whether Earl actually was an insured of
Safeco and whether the settlement was negotiated in good faith
and not collusively remained for resolution by the trial court.7 4
The question of the insured's good faith in settling the claim
against him was seen as the key to imposing any liability on the
insurer for the settlement. The fact that the insurer did not aban-
don the insured altogether, but merely reserved its rights to con-
test coverage while defending, was seen as limiting its maximum
71. Id. at 745.
72. Id. at 746.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 746-47.
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liability to the amount of a reasonable settlement up to its policy
limits. Thus, the court remanded the action to the trial court for
resolution of these factual issues.
Some jurisdictions which uphold the conditional defense ex-
ception to the insurer's exclusive control draw a distinction be-
tween cases in which the reservation of rights was based on a
coverage defense, i.e., a defense that the claim was not covered
under the policy, and those in which the reservation of rights was
based on a policy defense, i.e., a defense that the policy was unen-
forceable because the insured breached a condition of the policy.
This approach is illustrated in Continental Insurance Co. v. Bayless
& Roberts, Inc. 7 5 In that case, the insurer, Continental, initially un-
dertook the defense of its insured, Bayless & Roberts, Inc., in a per-
sonal injury action, without any reservation of rights. After trial of
the action had commenced, the insurer sought to continue the de-
fense under a reservation of its rights to disclaim coverage for
breach of the cooperation clause. This breach was alleged to have
occurred because an officer of the insured knowingly gave conflict-
ig testimony regarding the facts giving rise to the litigation.
The insured refused to accept this conditional defense and re-
placed the attorney retained by the insurer with counsel of its own
choosing. The insured's new attorney notified Continental that the
other two defendants had settled for approximately $458,000 and
requested that Continental accept the current demand against
Bayless & Roberts for $160,000. Following Continental's refusal,
the insured's new attorney entered into a consent judgment in
favor of the claimant for $618,000 and entered into an agreement
with the claimant whereby the claimant agreed not to execute on
the judgment against any assets of Bayless & Roberts except its
claim against Continental. The insured, in turn, agreed to prose-
cute its claim against the insurer, and to assign any proceeds
thereof to the plaintiff in the personal injury action.
Pursuant to this agreement, Bayless & Roberts then instituted
an action against Continental alleging that the insurer's refusal to
defend except under a reservation of rights agreement constituted
a breach of its fiduciary duty to its insured. Continental counter-
claimed, charging that Bayless & Roberts had breached its duty to
cooperate with its insurer. The court dismissed the counterclaim
upon a motion for directed verdict, and the jury found that Conti-
nental had acted negligently and had breached its duty to defend
Bayless & Roberts. Continental appealed to the Alaska Supreme
Court.
The central issue on appeal, of course, was whether the insured
75. 608 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1980).
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breached the cooperation clause by refusing to accept the reserva-
tion of rights which Continental attempted to impose on its de-
fense during the course of the trial. The court noted that there
were two different views on this issue. The general rule required
that "if an insured refuses to accede to the insurer's reservation of
rights, the carrier must either accept liability under the policy and
defend unconditionally, or surrender control of the defense and be
held liable if it guessed wrong on the coverage issue." 76 The alter-
native approach allowed the insurer to defend in the action and, if
judgment were entered against its insured, it would not be es-
topped from contesting coverage in a later action. 77
The court noted, however, that these divergent views had devel-
oped from cases in which the insurer attempted to condition the
defense on reservation of its right to assert a coverage defense,
whereas the matter before it developed from the insurer's attempt
to condition its defense on reservation of its right to assert a policy
defense, i.e., breach of the cooperation clause. The court specifi-
cally declined to state whether an insured was obligated to accept
a conditional defense from an insurer who wished to reserve its
right to assert a coverage defense.7 8 The court did, however,
clearly state that an insured would not be required to accept a de-
fense conditioned upon reservation of the right to assert a policy
defense: "[T]he insurance company must either affirm the policy
and defend unconditionally or repudiate the policy and withdraw
from the defense. The insurer may not reserve its right to repudi-
ate the policy, unless the insured consents to a reservation of that
right."79
This "all or nothing" approach by the court was, however, tem-
pered in a footnote suggestion that the insurer could retain its
right to later litigate a policy defense, provided it allowed the "in-
sured the right to retain independent counsel" and agreed to pay
the necessary costs of such counsel.80
76. Id. at 288.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 291.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 291 n.17f(dictum). The use of the word "independent" seems both con-
fusing and unfortunate. In view of the fact that the original counsel for Bay-
less & Roberts in the personal injury action, although presumably paid by
Continental, was not house counsel but rather was a member of a private
firm, the suggestion that he lacked independence smacks of impropriety in
dealing with his client, Bayless & Roberts, for the benefit of his principal,
Continental. In view of the general practice in the insurance industry that
defense counsel is chosen by the insurer, perhaps the court meant to indicate
that the insured should be offered the right to select counsel to represent him
in the personal injury action. The use of the expression "of its own choosing"
would certainly have more clearly expressed this intent than the word "in-
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In its actual holding, however, the court seemed to go out of its
way to punish the insurer for its attempt to defend the insured
while reserving a right to assert a policy defense to coverage. The
court held that the insurer's failure to notify the insured of its in-
tention to deny coverage until after the trial had begun "uvaived
this alleged breach of its cooperation clause as a matter of law,"8'
and, further, that the failure of the attorney retained by the insurer
to correct the conflict in testimony constituted a negligent defense
of the insured and rendered Continental liable for the entire
amount of the settlement without regard to its policy limits. 82
Moreover, even though the settlement was specifically arranged to
provide credit for the amounts already paid in settlement by the
other defendants,83 the court held that Continental was not enti-
tled to any such credit and would be required to pay the entire
amount of the settlement agreed to by its insured, plus interest
and costs.8 4 This represented a total payment of more than eight
times the insurer's policy limits and five times greater than the
final settlement demand of plaintiff's decedent.
In summary, then, it may be noted that the pendulum between
the rights of the insured and insurer seems to have swung full cy-
cle in development of the conditional defense exception to the rule
vesting complete control of defense and settlement in the insurer.
Thus, while in the earlier cases it was the insured which had to
decide at the outset to accept a conditional defense or forego cov-
erage, in the Continental Insurance case the court seems to have
gone out of its way to punish the insurer for having the temerity to
attach a condition to its defense. Perhaps the best balance be-
tween these two polar extremes and the view most likely to be fol-
lowed in other jurisdictions is the rule set forth in Taylor, which
allows the insured to reject a conditional defense and effect a set-
tlement which may be binding upon the insurer but does not strip
the insurer of any meaningful right to condition its defense.
Rather, the insurer is still protected by the court's requirement of
a tripartite showing that the claim was covered, the settlement was
in good faith and not collusive, and the amount thereof was
reasonable.
dependent" and would not gratuitously cast aspersions on the propriety and
ethics of counsel chosen by the insurer.
81. Id. at 292.
82. Id. at 293-94.
83. Id. at 297 (Boochever, CJ., dissenting in part).
84. Id. at 295-96.
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B. Excess Insurer's Right to Settle the Claim Against the Insured and
Obtain Reimbursement of the Objecting Primary Carrier's
Limits of Coverage
In contrast to the cases just discussed, where the key obstacle
to recovery of sums paid in settlement by the insured was the pres-
ence of policy language vesting control over settlements in the in-
surer, the key obstacle to recovery of sums spent in settlement by
an excess carrier from a primary or lower level excess carrier is
the absence of any policy language justifying such reimbursement.
Indeed, in the ordinary situation, there is no contract between the
primary and excess carriers. Rather, each carrier has a contract
only with the insured. Thus, reimbursement cannot be justified on
the grounds of any explicit contractual duty owed by the primary
or lower level carrier to the excess carrier.
An additional obstacle to recovery by the excess carrier may be
found in the Guiding Principles for Primary and Excess Insurers,85
to which many insurance companies subscribe. Under ordinary
principles of contribution and indemnity, an excess insurer seek-
ing reimbursement of sums spent in settlement from a primary in-
surer would need to show that it made demand upon the primary
insurer to settle the claim, but that such demand was rejected.
The Guiding Principles, however, specifically preclude such a for-
mal demand by the excess insurer: 'The excess insurer shall re-
frain from coercive or collusive conduct designed to force a
settlement. It shall never make formal demand upon a primary in-
surer that the latter settle a claim within its policy limit."86
In apparent recognition of the fact that failure to make a formal
demand could be deemed a waiver by the excess carrier in a sub-
sequent action against the primary carrier for wrongful refusal to
settle, the Guiding Principles further provide: "In any subsequent
proceeding between excess insurer and primary insurer, the fail-
ure of the excess insurer to make formal demand that the claim be
settled shall not be considered as having any bearing on the excess
insurer's claim against the primary insured."87
Extensive research revealed only one case which specifically
dealt with the rights of an excess insurer which settled a claim
85. Claims Executives Council of the American Ins. Ass'n & the American Mut.
Ins. Alliance, Guiding Principles for Insurers of Primary and Excess Cover-
ages (1974) (on file at the Nebraska Law Review). See generally P.
MAGARICK, EXCESS LLABILrTY: DUTrEs AND RESPONSIBILrrIES OF THE INSURERS
216-18 (1976).
86. Claims Executives Council of the American Ins. Ass'n & the American Mut.
Ins. Alliance, Guiding Principles for Insurers of Primary and Excess Cover-
ages (1974).
87. Id.
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over the primary insurer's objections and then instituted an action
to recover the primary carrier's limits.8 8 In view of excess insur-
ers' increasing tendency to become involved in the settlement of
claims and the potential for future litigation of this type, detailed
consideration of the court's opinion in Continental Casualty Co. v.
Reserve Insurance Co. 89 is appropriate.
In that case, plaintiff, Continental, provided excess liquor liabil-
ity insurance for the city of Marshall, Minnesota, with limits of
$900,000 in excess of the $50,000 primary coverage provided by de-
fendant Reserve. The city of Marshall was joined as a third-party
defendant in an action brought by Lucille Christianson and her
husband against Edward DeLange for injuries sustained in an au-
tomobile accident. The defendant joined the city on the ground
that it was liable under the Dramshop Act for an illegal sale of li-
quor to him by the municipal liquor store. On the second day of
trial, at which the city was represented by counsel provided by
both Reserve and Continental, a settlement in the amount of
$750,000 was reached among plaintiffs, DeLange's insurers, and
Continental. The settlement agreement provided that DeLange's
insurers would contribute $550,000 and Continental would contrib-
ute the remaining $200,000. Prior to this settlement, Continental
had made demand upon Reserve that it tender its full $50,000 pri-
mary limits toward settlement, but this demand was refused. Con-
tinental paid the entire $200,000 on behalf of the city and reserved
its rights against Reserve.
Continental sued Reserve, seeking to recover the amount of the
primary limits on the theory that Reserve's failure to contribute its
limits in settlement breached its contract with the city and consti-
tuted bad faith. The district court granted Reserve's motion for
judgment on the pleadings on the ground that Reserve could not
be held liable for refusing to contribute any part of its policy limits
toward settlement because there had been no judicial determina-
tion of the city's liability. Continental appealed to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, which reversed the trial court in a well-reasoned
opinion by Justice Kelly.
After stating the threshold question as "whether a primary in-
surer owes any duty to an excess insurer in the settlement negotia-
tion process,"9 0 and noting the duty of good faith which an insurer
owes an insured, the court bridged the contractual gap between
the excess and primary insurers by applying principles of subroga-
tion. The court stated:
88. Continental Cas. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862 (1976).
See note 56 supra.
89. 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862 (1976).
90. Id. at 8, 238 N.W.2d at 864.
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We hold that an excess insurer is subrogated to the insured's rights
against a primary insurer for breach of the primary insurer's good-faith
duty to settle.... When there is no excess insurer, the insured becomes
his own excess insurer, and his single primary insurer owes him a duty of
good faith in protecting him from an excess judgment and personal liabil-
ity. If the insured purchases excess coverage, he in effect substitutes an
excess insurer for himself. It follows that the excess insurer should as-
sume the rights as well as the obligations of the insured in that position.9 1
In support of its holding, the court noted that extension of the
primary insurer's duty to the excess insurer as well as to the in-
sured was consistent with the -bulk of the well-reasoned authority
from other jurisdictions and with the views of several leading com-
mentators.92 In addition, the court cited two crucial policy consid-
erations: society's interest in fair and reasonable settlement of
lawsuits and the fair distribution of losses among insurers. In re-
gard to the first consideration, the court found that in the absence
of a duty between the primary and excess insurers, the incentives
were against settlement.93 If the excess insurer elected to settle
despite the primary insurer's objections, it risked being forced to
pay the entire settlement itself. However, if the case were allowed
to go to trial, resulting in a judgment in excess of the primary's
policy limits, the primary insurer would be forced to pay at least
up to those limits. As to the second policy consideration, the court
found that forcing the excess insurer to make a reasonable settle-
ment covering both primary and excess liability would thwart the
purposes for having the different coverages. 94 The court concluded
that "[w] hether on insurance-economics principles or general eq-
uitable principles, a party should not be made to bear a loss that
rightfully belongs to another party."95
The court summarily rejected Reserve's argument that Conti-
nental had acted as a "gratuitous volunteer" and was "entitled to
no equitable consideration," noting that Continental had acted in
good faith and that there would be "no equity in penalizing an ex-
cess insurer who performs its duty in contrast to a primary insurer
who does not."96 The court gave similar short shrift to the argu-
ment that the excess carrier should have merely made a record of
its good faith and then sought to impose upon the primary liability
for the entire amount of whatever judgment might result from its
failure to settle. The court noted: "We think it better to avoid un-
necessary litigation by encouraging fulfillment of the good faith
91. Id.
92. Id. at 10 & n.7, 238 N.W.2d at 865 & n.7.
93. Id. at 9, 238 N.W.2d at 864-65.
94. Id. at 9-10, 238 N.W.2d at 865.
95. Id. at 10, 238 N.W.2d at 865.
96. Id. at 9 n.4, 238 N.W.2d at 865 n.4.
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duty by all insurers in the settlement process. '97
Reserve offered additional arguments against imposing liability
on it for the settlement: (1) the power to settle and seek reim-
bursement could be used as a bludgeon by the excess insurer to
force the primary insurer to settle cases of doubtful liability;
(2) there was an absence of any judgment against its insured; and
(3) it would be deprived of due process if Continental's right to
recovery were upheld.
The court rejected all three arguments. In cases of doubtful lia-
bility, the court imposed a duty on the primary insurer "to exercise
only good faith, not omniscient powers, in predicting litigation re-
sults."98 Only in the absence of good faith could the excess insurer
effect a settlement and seek reimbursement. In regard to the ab-
sence of any judgment, despite the lack of any case law directly on
point, the court found no difficulty in allowing a suit by the excess
insurer against the primary insurer. The court noted that the in-
sured could protect himself against the primary insurer's bad faith
refusal to settle by settling a claim and instituting a suit for reim-
bursement, and therefore, by virtue of subrogation, the excess in-
surer also obtained these rights.99 Furthermore, the primary
insurer was protected against an improper settlement since in the
subsequent lawsuit it "could claim that the insured was not liable
or [was] liable for less than its policy limits and those questions
could be tried by the jury along with the general issue of bad
faith."100 Finally, the court rejected Reserve's constitutional argu-
ment since it would be able to challenge in court the issue of its
bad faith and, if liable, the extent of its insured's liability.' 0
The court, in a footnote, emphasized that its holding was lim-
ited to situations involving bad faith and rejected the possibility
that the primary carrier should be held strictly liable for its failure
to settle.102 Thus, the Continental Casualty case must be viewed
as allowing recovery by the excess insurer only upon a showing
that the primary carrier's refusal to settle was in bad faith; a mere
showing that the claim settled by the excess carrier was covered
by the policy and that the amount of the settlement was reason-
able will be insufficient to warrant recovery by the excess
carrier. 03
97. Id. at 9 n.5, 238 N.W.2d at 865 n.5.
98. Id. at 12, 238 N.W.2d at 866.
99. Id. at 13-14, 238 N.W.2d at 867.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 14, 238 N.W.2d at 867-68.
102. Id. at 14 n.10, 238 N.W.2d at 868 n.10.
103. Because the Continental decision was not based on the primary's duty to de-
fend the insured, its rationale would also seem to support recovery by a
higher level excess carrier of sums spent by it in settlement of a claim against
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C. Insurer's Right to Settle and Sue the Insured for its Deductible,
Self-Insured Retention, or Participation
Extensive research has failed to reveal a single case in which an
insurer, prior to the entry of any judgment against its insured, set-
tled a claim and then sued the insured for reimbursement of its
deductible, self-insured retention, or participation. This should
not be read as an indication, however, that the issue is merely an
academic one. Rather, this absence of case law is attributable to
past practices in the insurance industry which are undergoing a
radical transformation.
The vast majority of insurance policies which have given rise to
litigation over the duty to settle have been automobile policies. 0 4
In these policies, the insured has had little or no financial involve-
ment in the coverage below the limits of the policy and little or no
control over defense and settlement of the claim. This pattern was
generally followed even with respect to larger commercial policies.
Thus, the focus of insurance litigation has been upon the insured's
efforts to force the insurer to live up to its obligations of defense
and settlement. The ever-increasing size of jury verdicts and set-
tlements, coupled with the concomitant upward spiral of premi-
ums and the evolution of novel theories of recovery, have led to
certain basic changes in the insurance industry which may effectu-
ate a shift in this focus.
The first such change concerns a policy requirement of the in-
sured's consent to settlement. As discussed above,105 insurance
policies have traditionally vested almost complete control over set-
tlement in the insurer, typically empowering it to settle claims not
only without the consent of the insured but also over the objection
of the insured. Increasing concern for the damage which settle-
ment of doubtful litigation might do to their reputations and the
desire to protect their own financial interests (especially the avail-
ability of their limits of coverage for other claims, premium ratings,
and future insurability) have led insureds to insist upon and ob-
tain policy language requiring their consent to any settlement.
Thus, it is not uncommon today for an insurance policy, especially
one of professional liability, to provide that the insurer "'shall not
its insured over the objections of a lower level excess carrier. Even though
such lower level excess carrier would ordinarily have no duty to defend the
insured, defense of the insured was not the key to liability in Continental.
Thus, recovery might be allowed if it can be shown that the claim was cov-
ered, the amount of the settlement was reasonable, and the lower level ex-
cess carrier's refusal to settle constituted bad faith.
104. See note 14 & accompanying text supra.
105. Id.
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settle any claim without the written consent of the insured,"'1 06
rather than providing that the insurer may settle claims in its dis-
cretion. Two issues are raised by the presence of such a clause in a
policy when there is a dispute between an insurer who wishes to
settle a claim and an insured who prefers litigation to judgment:
(1) whether, if the objections of the insured are valid, the insurer
will be liable for damage to the insured's reputation or financial
interests by settling over such objectionsl07 and (2) whether, if the
objections of the insured are unreasonable, the lack of the in-
sured's consent will preclude the insurer's recovery of any sums
spent by it in settlement which the insured should have posted
under the deductible, self-insured retention, or participation provi-
sions of the policy.
An additional change in the insurance industry is the amount of
financial involvement which the insured has in its coverage. Tradi-
tionally, the insured purchased insurance with the aim of protect-
ing himself against virtually all liability below the limits of
coverage. Thus, the typical policy which gave rise to litigation be-
tween the insured and insurer concerning settlement contained
only a very limited deductible which was not at issue in such litiga-
tion. Recently, however, the reluctance of insurers to provide cov-
erage from "dollar one" and the desire of insureds to reduce their
premiums has led to insureds' increasing financial involvement in
their own coverage. This financial involvement may take one or
more of the following three forms: (1) a substantial deductible,
which may be as high as $500,000 or $1 million in some of the larger
professional and products liability policies; (2) a large self-insured
retention, which may be applicable either before any coverage or
between layers of coverage; and (3) a participation by the insured
in one or more layers of coverage whereby the insured provides a
percentage of the layer.
The final significant change in the insurance industry is the re-
cent trend toward imposition of an express duty to settle upon the
insured. 08 As noted above, 0 9 earlier policies either vested control
of settlement in the insurer or merely required the consent of the
insured to settlement without imposing any affirmative duty upon
the insured to effect settlement. The recent trend toward greater
financial involvement by the insured in its own coverage raises the
106. Transit Cas. Corp. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 129 n.1, 156 Cal. Rptr.
360, 365 n.1, (1979) (quoting primary policy), disapproved in part, Commer-
cial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912,610 P.2d 1038,
164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980).
107. Discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
108. See Section ]ILC. of the text infra.
109. See note 14 & accompanying text supra.
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issue of whether the insured has an affirmative duty to settle a
claim within its financial limits when it has the opportunity to do
so and failure to effect such settlement may lead to an adverse
judgment, satisfaction of which will require increased payments
by the insurers. Although many policies are silent on this point
and, therefore, the insured's duty to settle thereunder must be bot-
tomed on an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, some poli-
cies specifically impose upon the insured an affirmative duty to
settle claims within its deductible, self-insured retention, or partic-
ipation where it is reasonable and appropriate to do so.
The cumulative effect of these changes in the insurance indus-
try is to virtually turn upside down the very nature of the basic
conflict of interest between insured and insurer. Thus, under a
policy which provides for the insured's substantial financial in-
volvement in the coverage and vests control over settlement in the
insured, it is not necessarily in the insured's best interest to settle,
nor is it always in the insurer's best interest not to settle. Rather,
especially in cases where the claim cannot be settled for less than
the total amount of the insured's financial involvement in the cov-
erage, the insured may well wish to litigate the claim in the hopes
of obtaining a verdict which is either favorable or, if adverse, at
least in an amount less than the insured's financial involvement.
The insurer, on the other hand, may wish to settle in order to elimi-
nate or reduce the increased exposure which it will have if the case
is not settled.
The authors submit that, in an appropriate case, the insurer
should have the right to settle the claim and sue the insured for
the amount due toward such settlement under its deductible, self-
insured retention, or participation. Where the policy specifically
imposes a duty to settle upon the insured, the insurer may attempt
to seek specific enforcement of such duty,"n0 or may choose to set-
tle and sue to recover the sums thus spent on a theory of breach of
that express contractual agreement. As we have seen, however,
the absence of language specifically imposing a duty to settle has
not barred the courts from imposing such a duty by implication
upon insurers."1 Accordingly, it seems that such an implied duty
might also be imposed onan insured in an appropriate case.1 12
110. It should be noted, however, that filing and prosecuting such a suit prior to
satisfaction of the claim against the insured might well increase the insured's
exposure. Such a result would not only be harmful to the insurer bringing
the action but might also be regarded as indicative of bad faith towards the
insured. See Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621
(10th Cir. 1942).
111. See Sections ILA. & ILB. of the text supra.
112. An appropriate case would be where the insured is refusing to settle, not out
of any genuine belief that the case is defensible or can be brought to verdict
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Irrespective of whether the insurer's suit is based on an express
or implied duty on the part of the insured, its right of recovery
should not be without limit. Rather, the insurer's right should be
judged by a mirror of the standard which determines the insured's
rights to settle and sue as discussed above.1 1 3 Thus, in jurisdic-
tions where good faith is the standard,114 the insurer should be al-
lowed to settle and obtain reimbursement from the insured upon a
showing that its refusal to settle constituted bad faith as that stan-
dard is interpreted in such jurisdictions. In jurisdictions where the
insured's right to settle and shift the burden of settlement to the
insurer is limited to situations where the insurer disclaimed cover-
age and refused to defend,115 the insurer's right to settle and sue
the insured for reimbursement should be limited to situations
where the insured refused to assist and cooperate in its own
defense.116
The concept of an insurer suing its insured for sums spent in
settlement is not entirely novel. The California Supreme Court,
which is noted for its protective attitude toward the insured, sug-
gested that there are instances in which the insurer may settle and
sue the insured for reimbursement of the sums thus spent. In Jo-
hansen v. California State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance
lower than the self-insured retention or deductible, but solely in order to save
its deductible or retention and in an effort to force the insurer to put up all
sums without regard to the financial involvement of the insured in its own
coverage. In other words, we would suggest that the standards and factors
considered in determining whether liability should be imposed upon an in-
sured for bad faith refusal to settle should mirror the standards and factors
used in determining whether to impose such liability upon an insurer.
113. See Section IA. of the text supra.
114. But see notes 290-92 & accompanying text infra, in which the authors suggest
that good faith is an inappropriate standard for determining the right of one
party to settle over the objections of the other and still obtain reimbursement
therefrom. In good faith jurisdictions, the efforts of an insurer to persuade an
insured with a large deductible, retention, or participation to contribute its
share to an appropriate settlement should be likened to an effort to persuade
or force a primary carrier to contribute its limits. The legitimacy of this effort
was recognized in Continental Cas. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 307 Minn. 5, 238
N.W.2d 862 (1976), and distinguished from an effort to persuade an insured
without such a large financial involvement to contribute to settlement below
primary limits, an effort which may be regarded as bad faith. Netzley v. Na-
tionwide Ins. Co., 63 Ohio Op. 2d 127,34 Ohio App. 2d 65,296 N.E.2d 550 (1971).
115. See notes 28-39 & accompanying text supra.
116. An alternative method of proceeding for an insurer faced with such an unco-
operative insured is to declare a breach of the cooperation clause and dis-
claim coverage. Such a response may not only be unsuccessful, but may also
lead to disastrous results. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts,
Inc., 608 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1980), and text accompanying notes 66-84 supra.
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Bureau,"17 the court suggested that an insurer who contests cover-
age of the claim asserted against the insured has the right to settle
the claim and obtain reimbursement upon vindication of its cover-
age position. If the insurer can obtain reimbursement of sums
spent in settlement of claims for which there is no coverage, then,
afortiori, it should have the right to settle claims which are cov-
ered and obtain reimbursement from the insured's financial in-
volvement in such coverage.
Moreover, there are sound legal, public policy, and business
reasons supporting the allowance of such a suit by the insurer.
First, it may be noted that the duty to settle has been imposed
upon an insurer as a logical concomitant of its implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing." 8 If that duty is to be truly reciprocal,"n9
then the duty to settle in good faith should logically be imposed
upon the insured in appropriate cases, binding both the insured
and insurer so that "neither party will do anything which will in-
jure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the
agreement."120
Support for this proposition may also be derived by analogy to
the reasoning of the court in Continental Casualty Co. v. Reserve
Insurance Co.121 In that case, the court equated the position of the
excess carrier to that of the insured in certain instances:
When there is no excess insurer, the insured becomes his own excess in-
surer, and his single primary insurer owes him a duty of good faith in pro-
tecting him from an excess judgment and personal liability. If the insured
purchases excess coverage, he in effect substitutes an excess insurer for
himself. It follows that the excess insurer should assume the rights as
well as the obligations of the insured in that position.12 2
Similarly, when the insured deliberately purchases insurance
which provides for a large deductible, self-insured retention, or
117. 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975). For a discussion of the
suggestion mentioned in the text, see text accompanying notes 139-66 infra.
118. E.g., Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958).
119. Some courts have suggested in other contexts, that the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing is or should be reciprocal. See, e.g., Sargent v. Johnson,
551 F.2d 221, (8th Cir. 1977); Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. North Star Reinsurance
Corp., 90 Cal. App. 3d 786, 153 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1979) (insured's duty of good
faith prohibited its collusion with primary to artificially set dates of loss in
manner maximizing excess carrier's liability); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Altfl-
lisen Constr. Co., 70 Cal. App. 2d 789, 139 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1977) (insured
breached duty of good faith when it destroyed insurer's subrogation rights
against third parties).
120. Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200
(1958) (citing Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881
(1944)).
121. 307 Minn. 5, 238 N.W.2d 862 (1976).
122. Id. at 8, 238 N.W.2d at 864.
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participation, it in effect substitutes itself for the primary insurer.
Paraphrasing the language of Continental Casualty and extending
that case's reasoning, "it follows that the [insured] should assume
the rights as well as the obligations of the [primary insurer] in that
position." Thus, the insurer would be entitled to settle the claim
against the insured and obtain reimbursement in the same manner
and to the same extent as the excess carrier was allowed to settle
and sue the primary in Continental Casualty.
A balancing of benefits and burdens also mandates the conclu-
sion that the insurer should be allowed to settle and seek reim-
bursement from the insured in appropriate cases. Clearly, when
an insured purchases a policy which has a substantial deductible,
retention, or participation provision, its premiums are significantly
lower than they would be if the insured had purchased a policy
without such provisions. The benefit of such lower premiums
must carry with it the burden of settling cases within such provi-
sions where possible and appropriate. 23
Finally, allowing a cause of action by the insurer against the
insured serves two important public interests. The first is obvi-
ously that of extrajudicial settlement of litigation.124 The second,
perhaps less obvious, interest is in having the greatest amount of
insurance available at the lowest price.125 If the insured is free to
block settlement and the insurers are precluded from settling and
suing to recover the insured's deductible, retention, or participa-
tion, policies offering such provisions obviously will become either
less available, because such provisions will have substantially lost
their meaning, or more expensive. Either of these events would
clearly be against the general public interest.
123. A benefit and burden analysis has been suggested in other contexts involving
the resolution of settlement disputes. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66
Cal. 2d 425, 431, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13,. 17 (1967), discussed in text
accompanying notes 187-92 in fra, in which the California Supreme Court sug-
gested that a strict liability standard would serve "elementary justice" be-
cause it would place the burden of an incorrect decision not to settle on the
carrier, who would receive the benefit of any correct decision not to settle.
124. E.g., Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1977).
125. The increase in excess premiums which would inevitably result from a rule
that the excess carrier could not sue the primary carrier for bad faith refusal
to settle has been cited in support of the rejection of such a prohibition. Val-
entine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292, 297 (9th Cir. 1977). Accord, Continental
Cas. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 516 F. Supp. 384, 393 (N.D. Cal.
1981); Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347, 1351 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
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I. IMPOSITION OF EXCESS LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO
SETTLE: ALLOCATING LIABILITY FOR THE
DAMAGE DONE BY THE STORM
Not every failure to settle a claim against the insured, of course,
will result in the type of verdict which will necessitate further liti-
gation between the party pressing for settlement and the party op-
posing settlement. There are, however, two types of verdicts
which may require such litigation. The first is a verdict which, al-
though within the limits of the insured's coverage (primary or ex-
cess), is higher than the amount for which the case could have
been settled. The insurer, who pressed for settlement and whose
required payment has been increased, will seek to impose liability
for such excess of the verdict over the settlement demand upon
the party opposing settlement. The second is a verdict which is in
excess of the insured's policy limits and the insured demanded
that the case be settled for or within the policy limits. The insured
will attempt to hold the recalcitrant insurer liable for the entire
amount of the verdict without regard to policy limits.
The vast majority of so-called excess liability cases have been
brought by insureds against their insurers after verdicts of the sec-
ond type. Recently, however, there have been several cases
brought either by excess insurers against primary insurers or by
insurers against their insureds seeking to impose excess liability
as a result of verdicts of the first type. This section of the Article
will review the standards which have been developed in the more
traditional "excess liability" suits brought by insureds against in-
surers as well as the developing standards for imposition of excess
liability in suits brought by excess carriers against primary or
lower level excess carriers and in suits brought by insurers against
their insureds.
A. Insurer's Excess Liability in Action Brought by Insured Following
Insurer's Refusal to Settle Within Policy Limits
The typical insurance policy does not specifically impose a duty
upon the insurer to settle claims against the insured. Rather, as
has been noted,126 the policy usually speaks in terms of the power
of the insurer to settle claims in its discretion. Based upon this
absence of language, early decisions uniformly held that an in-
surer would not be liable for refusing to settle.12 7 Rather, in the
event of an adverse verdict in excess of policy limits following the
insurer's refusal of a demand for settlement within policy limits,
126. See text accompanying notes 28-39 supra.
127. E.g., Georgia Cas. Co. v. Cotton Mills Prod. Co., 159 Miss. 396,132 So. 73 (1931);
McDonald v. Royal Indem. Co., 109 NJ. 308, 162 A. 620 (1932).
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the insurer could fulfill its obligations under the policy merely by
paying its limits in satisfaction of the judgment. 28 The insured
was then required to satisfy the excess of the verdict over the lim-
its from its own assets.
The trend in the law today is clearly away from this immunity
of insurers for refusal to settle and toward imposition of excess
liability upon insurers. Thus, in virtually every jurisdiction today
an insurer may be held liable for the excess of an adverse verdict
over policy limits where it is shown that the insurer's refusal to
settle the claim within the policy limits violated a certain standard
of conduct. 2 9 There is no general agreement among the jurisdic-
tions, however, as to the appropriate standard by which the refusal
should be measured. At least four separate standards have been
either adopted or suggested:
1. At least one jurisdiction still adheres to the rule that excess liability
may not be imposed upon an insurer unless its refusal to settle was so
arbitrary and capricious as to constitute fraud.
1 3 0
2. The majority of jurisdictions hold that excess liability may be imposed
upon an insurer if it is shown that the refusal to settle was made in bad
faith, but there is substantial disagreement among those jurisdictions as
to what type of conduct by the insurer will be sufficient to constitute bad
faith.13 1
3. Some jurisdictions have adopted a negligence standard, allowing the
imposition of excess liability upon an insurer if it is shown that-the refusal
to settle was the result of the insurer's failure to use due care.
1 3 2
4. A few jurisdictions have suggested a strict liability standard under
which excess liability would be imposed upon an insurer, without regard
to fault, whenever an adverse verdict in excess of policy limits follows a
refusal to settle within or for policy limits.
1 3 3
Each of these standards for the imposition of excess liability in
suits brought by insureds against insurers will be discussed in
some detail as a prelude to a more detailed discussion of the stan-
dards which are, or may be, imposed in excess liability suits
brought between insurers at different levels of coverage or by in-
surers against their insureds.
128. See, e.g., McDonald v. Royal Indem. Co., 109 N.J.L 308, 162 A. 620 (1932).
129. 7C J. APPLEmAN, supra note 4, §§ 4711-4715. In Comunale v. Traders & General
Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958), the court set forth the
rationale for allowing recovery beyond the policy limits, reasoning that the
limits govern only the carrier's obligation for performance of its duty to settle
and are inapplicable to a suit based upon breach of that duty.
130. Martin v. Travelers Indem. Co., 450 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1971) (applying Missis-
sippi law).
131. See text accompanying notes 139-66 infra.
132. See text accompanying 167-84 infra.
133. See text accompanying 185-202 infra.
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1. Fraud as the Standard for Imposition of Excess Liability
The rule that an insurer cannot be liable beyond its policy lim-
its for refusing to settle a claim against its insured absent a show-
ing of fraud was stated more than forty years ago by the
Mississippi Supreme Court in Farmers Gin Co. v. St. Paul Indem-
nity Co.:' 34
In the absence of proof of a refusal to properly investigate the case, or
conduct defense of it fairly, without willful oppression, or arbitrary action
in refusing to settle the case [which] was so unreasonable as to constitute
fraud, there can be no liability on the policy beyond the limits therein
agreed to by the parties thereto.
13 5
Although at one time a majority of jurisdictions might have em-
ployed the fraud standard, only a small minority of jurisdictions
use this standard today. Most jurisdictions have replaced fraud
with either good faith or negligence as the appropriate standard for
the imposition of excess liability.136 Under the more modern stan-
dards, of course, proof of fraud will suffice for the imposition of
excess liability but failure to establish fraud is not necessarily fa-
tal. 37 It should be noted, however, that this trend away from the
fraud standard is not universal. Indeed, the continued validity of
the fraud standard in Mississippi was reaffirmed by the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Martin v. Travelers Indemnity Co.138 as
recently as 1971.
2. Good Faith as the Standard for Imposition of Excess
Liability
Although a majority of jurisdictions use "good faith" as the
standard to impose excess liability upon an insurer for refusal to
settle, 39 these jurisdictions are not in agreement as to the mean-
ing of "good faith". Rather, there is substantial disagreement
among these so-called "good faith" jurisdictions with respect to
two crucial issues. First, there is disagreement as to whether the
duty to exercise good faith in attempting to settle claims within
policy limits is an affirmative one, requiring the insurer to actively
134. 186 Miss. 747, 191 So. 415 (1939).
135. Id. at 754, 191 So. at 417.
136. 7C J. APPLEmAN, supra note 4, §§ 4711-4714. Some jurisdictions which have
nominally shifted to a good faith standard define that standard in a way
which is not significantly different from a fraud standard. See, e.g., Netzley v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 63 Ohio Op. 2d 127,34 Ohio App. 2d 65, 72,296 N.E.2d 550,
556 (1971), in which the court equated bad faith under Ohio law with moral
obliquity and conscious wrongdoing.
137. See e.g., Alt v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 340, 237 N.W.2d 706
(1976).
138. 450 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1971).
139. But see discussion in note 169 infra.
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seek out opportunities for such settlement, or merely a responsive
one, triggered only by a demand for settlement for or within the
policy limits.140 Second, there is disagreement as to the appropri-
ate test by which to determine whether the insurer has fulfilled its
duty to settle in good faith.141
With regard to the first issue, some courts hold that proof of an
offer to settle within or for policy limits is an absolute prerequisite
to imposition of excess liability upon an insurer for its bad faith
refusal to settle. Thus, in Baton v. Transamerica Insurance Co.,142
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court hold-
ing that an insurance company was liable for bad faith refusal to
settle, when there was no clear proof of an unequivocal offer to
settle for or within policy limits. Even in such jurisdictions, how-
ever, an insurer is not totally relieved of responsibility to settle by
the mere fact that the claimant's demand is for an amount in ex-
cess of policy limits. The insurer may still be held liable if the in-
sured can demonstrate that it would have contributed .the
necessary amount above policy limits or if it can be shown that
further negotiation by the insurer would have resulted in reduc-
tion of the demand to one within the policy limits. As one court
stated.
Where an insurer receives an offer of settlement in excess of the coverage
of its policy it acts in bad faith if it fails to make any attempt to engage the
injured plaintiffs counsel in discussions seeking a reduction in the initial
settlement demand and if it fails to inform its insured of the opportunity
to settle. The initial demand of plaintiff's counsel often will be as far re-
moved from the actual figure acceptable in settlement as the ad damnum
in the Complaint is removed from the initial settlement demand, espe-
cially in a personal injury action. It is a matter of common knowledge that
it is a rare case where exploration of the possibilities of settlement, be-
yond the mere receipt of the plaintiffs demand, will not result in some
substantial reduction of the amount.143
Other jurisdictions, especially those imposing high standards of
good faith upon insurers, do not require proof of an offer to settle
within policy limits as a prerequisite to the imposition of excess
liability upon the insurer. Rather, the insurer is under an affirma-
tive duty to pursue settlement. This view is exemplified by the
opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Rova Farms Resort v.
Investors Insurance Co.,144 in which the insurer's defense that
140. Compare Baton v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1978) (firm
offer required) with Rova Farms Resort v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 323
A.2d 495 (1974) (offer not prerequisite to bad faith liability).
141. See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 147-66 infra.
142. 584 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1978).
143. Young v. American Cas. Co., 416 Fid 906, 910-11 (2d Cir. 1969).
144. 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).
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there was no offer to settle within policy limits was rejected. The
court stated:
It would be unrealistic to believe that such an offer [to settle within policy
limits] is a prerequisite for finding the insurer to have acted other than in
good faith .... The better view is that the insurer has an affirmative duty
to explore settlement possibilities .... At most, the absence of a formal
request to settle within the policy is merely one factor to be considered in
light of the surrounding circumstances, on the issue of good faith.1 45
In support of its holding, the court cited State Automobile Insur-
ance Co. v. Rowland,146 in which the Tennessee Supreme Court
had also held that proof of an offer to settle within policy limits was
not absolutely necessary to impose excess liability upon an in-
surer for bad faith refusal to settle.
There is also wide disagreement among the jurisdictions as to
the appropriate definitional test of "good faith". The more con-
servative view was perhaps best expressed by the Nebraska
Supreme Court in Olson v. Union Fire Insurance Co.,147 in which
good faith was equated with honesty:
If the insurer has exercised good faith in all of its dealings under its policy,
if the settlement which it has rejected has been fully and fairly considered
and has been based on an honest belief that the insurer could defeat the
action or keep the judgment within the limits of the policy, and if its deter-
mination is based on a fair review of the evidence after reasonable dili-
gence in ascertaining the facts, accompanied by competent legal advice, a
court will not subject the insurer to liability in excess of policy limits if it
ultimately turns out that its determination is a mistaken one. 14 8
A more stringent test followed in some jurisdictions may be re-
ferred to as the "equal consideration" test. The rationale underly-
ing this test was set forth in McChristian v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.:149
The determination by the Court as to the insurer's good faith necessarily
involves considerable second-guessing. The decision not to settle must be
an honest one, resulting from a fair weighing of probabilities. The officers
of any large insurance company have a great deal of experience in han-
dling claims arising out of automobile accidents and are entitled to use
that experience in reaching a decision. A good faith decision is, therefore,
simply an honest and intelligent one, giving equal consideration to the in-
terest of the insured, made in light of the company's expertise in the field.
The requirement is satisfied if reasonable settlement possibilities are ex-
hausted by the company. 15 0
The McChristian opinion made it quite clear that "where reason-
able cause appear[ed], in the form of a clearly litigable issue as to
damages or liability, for rejecting a settlement offer and defending
145. Id. at 493, 323 A.2d at 505.
146. 221 Tenn. 421, 435, 427 S.W.2d 30, 36 (1968).
147. 174 Neb. 375, 118 N.W.2d 318 (1962).
148. Id. at 380, 118 N.W.2d at 323.
149. 304 F. Supp. 748 (W.D. Ark. 1969).
150. Id. at 753 (emphasis in original).
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the action,"' 5 ' the insurer would be justified in refusing to settle.
Some courts have stated this test in a slightly different fashion,
holding that "the insurance company must give at least equal con-
sideration to the insured's interests as to its own when making set-
tlement decisions,"s5 2 or that "the insurer is generally required to
weigh the interests of the insured at least equally with its own."153
In view of the fact that the insurer clearly has an interest in not
paying claims which are not covered under its policy, it would
seem that an honest belief that the claim was not covered, coupled
with an attempt to have the coverage issue resolved in a declara-
tory judgment action, would be a sufficient reason for an insurer to
reject settlement pending such resolution. Indeed, this has been
suggested in at least one case.154
Other cases nominally applying the "equal consideration test"
have come to a contrary conclusion. Thus, in Communale v. Trad-
ers & General Insurance Co.,155 the California Supreme Court, af-
ter stating that "[t]he insurer, in deciding whether a claim should
be compromised, must take into account the interest of the insured
and give it at least as much consideration as it does to its own in-
terest," 5 6 summarily precluded the insurer's consideration of its
interest in not paying claims which are not covered under its pol-
icy. The court stated:
We do not agree with the cases that hold there is no liability in excess
of the policy limits where the insurer, believing there is no coverage,
wrongfully refuses to defend and without justification refuses to settle the
claim. An insurer who denies coverage does so at its own risk, and, al-
though its position may not have been entirely groundless, if'the denial is
found to be wrongful it is liable for the full amount which will compensate
the insured for all the detriment caused by the insurer's breach of the
express and implied obligations of the contract.
15 7
151. Id. In another recent case, it was also held that the insured's demand that
the insurer not settle the claim against him because it might weaken his
counterclaim precluded a later bad faith claim against the insurer. Boston
Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1980).
152. Peterson v. All City Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying New York
law).
153. Sobus v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 393 F. Supp. 661, 672 (D. Md. 1975).
154. Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. App. 1965). The declara-
tory judgment action must be conducted in good faith. Traders & General Ins.
Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1951). See also Beck v.
Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 429 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1970) (applying
Pennsylvania law, court affirmed holding that carrier could not be liable for
excess of verdict over policy limits where its declination of coverage, albeit
mistaken, was made in good faith). For a further discussion of this issue, see
the various opinions in Luke v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 1015
(8th Cir. 1972).
155. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
156. Id. at 659, 328 P.2d at 201.
157. Id. at 660, 328 P.2d at 201-02.
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The continuing search for a working definition of good faith by
which to determine the excess liability of an insurer for wrongful
refusal to settle has led some courts to adopt what may be referred
to as the "no limits" test. This test has been expressed as follows:
When it is probable that an adverse verdict will exceed the policy limit,
the propriety of an insurer's refusal to accept a settlement offer which is
within the coverage requires a resolution of conflicting interests. In our
judgment, in view of the duty of the insurer to act in good faith, the resolu-
tion can lead to but one fair result: both interests can be served justly
only if the insurer treats any settlement offer as if it had full coverage for
whatever verdict might be recovered, regardless of policy limits, and
makes its decision to settle or go to trial on that basis. 15 8
Careful review of the cases applying the "no limits test" indi-
cates that it does not allow for even remotely equal consideration
of the insurer's and insured's interests. Rather, the test simply re-
quires the insurer to sacrifice its interest for the protection of the
insured wherever it appears possible that an adverse verdict may
exceed policy limits. This point may be seen from an examination
of the decision of the California Supreme Court in Johansen v. Cal-
ifornia State Automobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau.159
In Johansen, plaintiff was an injured tort claimant who sued as
assignee of the insureds' rights against the defendant, their in-
surer, for excess liability following refusal to settle for policy lim-
its. At the beginning of the personal injury litigation, the insurer
asserted that its policy did not provide coverage and instituted a
declaratory judgment action, seeking to vindicate its position.
However, the insurer continued to defend its insureds under a res-
ervation of rights. When the plaintiff in the personal injury action
offered to settle for policy limits, the insurer did not flatly reject
this demand, but offered to place its entire policy limits in an inter-
est-bearing escrow account with the agreement that the entire
amount would be paid to the plaintiff in the event the declaratory
judgment action resulted in a determination of coverage. This of-
fer was rejected, and the subsequent trial of the personal injury
action resulted in a verdict against the insureds substantially in
excess of policy limits.
At the trial of the excess liability action, the court rendered
judgment in favor of the defendant insurer on the basis that the
insurer's bona fide belief that coverage did not exist, coupled with
the manner in which it both defended its insureds and attempted
to resolve the coverage issue, negated any finding of bad faith.
158. Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 51 N.J. 62, 71-72, 237 A.2d 857, 862 (1968).
Other cases have tempered this rule by suggesting that the duty to settle
does not arise where an excess verdict is not reasonably foreseeable. Fulton
v. Woodford, 26 Ariz. App. 17, 545 P.2d 979. (1976).
159. 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975).
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This verdict was upheld by the court of appea,160 which cited re-
peated instances of the insurer's good faith and criticized the collu-
sion between the insureds and the tort claimant. The court of
appeal noted that the bad faith rule is, and must be, limited in its
application:
The bad faith rule-consistently followed in California-is a sound, salu-
tary principle. It permits an excess recovery against those insurance car-
riers which refuse to acknowledge their obligations... and at the same
time recognizes that every refusal to settle on the demand of others whose
interests may not be parallel with-but in fact may well be adverse to-
those of the insurer is not asserted in bad faith.16 1
The California Supreme Court reversed the holding of the court
of appeal. 6 2 The supreme court made it clear that it was con-
cerned only with the interests of the insureds and not with any
interests of the insurer.
[I] n deciding whether or not to compromise the claim, the insurer must
conduct itself as though it alone were liable for the entire amount of the
judgment. Thus, the only permissible consideration in evaluating the rea-
sonableness of the settlement offer becomes whether, in light of the vic-
tim's injuries and the probable liability of the insured, the ultimate
judgment is likely to exceed the amount of the settlement offer. Such fac-
tors as the limits imposed by the policy, a desire to reduce the amount of
future settlements, or a belief that the policy does not provide coverage,
should not affect a decision as to whether the settlement offer in question
is a reasonable one.163
The court ended its opinion with the somewhat sophistic sug-
gestion that its decision did not leave the insurer entirely without
protection:
Finally, we cannot accept defendant's complaint that the Comunale [good
faith] rule requires an insurer to settle in all cases irrespective of whether
the policy provides coverage. Clearly, if defendant's belief that the policy
did not provide coverage in the instant case had been vindicated, it would
not be liable for damages flowing from its refusal to settle; all that
Comunale establishes is that an insurer who fails to settle does so "at its
own risk." Moreover, contrary to defendant's assertion, an insurer in de-
fendant's position retains the ability to enter an agreement with the in-
sured reserving its right to assert a defense of noncoverage even if it
accepts a settlement offer. If, having reserved such rights and having ac-
cepted a reasonable offer, the insurer subsequently establishes the non-
coverage of its policy, it would be free to seek reimbursement of the
settlement payment from its insured.164
Such professed solicitude for the interests of the insurer ig-
nored the fact that the insurer did attempt to vindicate its beliefs
160. 41 Cal. App. 3d 974,116 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1974), rev'd and remanded, 15 Cal. 3d 9,
538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975).
161. 41 Cal. App. 3d at -, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
162. 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975).
163. Id. at 16, 538 P.2d at 748-49, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93.
164. Id. at 19, 538 P.2d at 750, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
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concerning coverage in a fashion which would have protected the
insureds and allowed for a conditional settlement, but was
thwarted in this effort by the collusion of the insureds and the tort
plaintiff. In addition, the court ignored the fact that the insurer
would have virtually no realistic chance of recovering any substan-
tial sums of money from its insureds if the procedure suggested by
the court were followed and coverage were determined to be lack-
ing.165 Indeed, the California approach to good faith in Johansen
has been severely criticized in a leading authority on insurance
law:
Remarkable good faith was shown [by the insurer in Johansen ]. A belief
coverage does not exist should not be an excuse not to try to settle a claim
but here the insurer did all it could reasonably be expected to do-good
faith offer, attempt to expedite determination of coverage and proper di-
rection of trial tactics. Unfortunately, the California Supreme Court in its
overwhelming generosity to injured parties (at the ultimate expense, of
course, of insureds who must pay higher premiums) no longer does more
than give lip service to the good faith test.166
3. Negligence as the Standard for Imposition of Excess
Liability
Although negligence has been rejected as a standard of liability
in many cases,167 some jurisdictions allow the imposition of excess
liability on an insurer upon a showing that it failed to use due care
in weighing an offer for settlement within policy limits. Unfortu-
nately, the distinction between good faith and negligence is often
blurred in the cases discussing the appropriate standard for the
imposition of excess liability. This confusion is perhaps best illus-
trated by the opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Radio
Taxi Service, Inc. v. Lincoln Mutual Insurance Co.168 In that case,
the court noted that the confusion in the law was so great that two
leading authorities on insurance law had taken opposite positions
as to whether negligence or good faith was the standard applied in
165. It must be noted that, in following this suggestion, the insurer would have
had to pay its limits to the third-party claimant but would have had to seek
reimbursement from the insureds. There is no suggestion in the case that the
insureds had such a large sum available for repayment to the insurer if cover-
age were determined to be lacking. In fact, the insureds' refusal to settle and
then sue the insurer suggests that they did not have such funds. Indeed,
most individual insureds would not have such sums available, and this is one
of the reasons why they purchase insurance. Similar considerations may not
apply in the large commercial and professional policies and, accordingly, this
settle and sue approach may be workable in those cases. See discussion in
text at sections H.C. supra and II.C. infra.
166. 7C J. APPLEmAN, supra note 4, § 4712 n.41.
167. See, e.g., Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511
(1973).
168. 31 N.J. 299, 157 A.2d 319 (1960).
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the majority of jurisdictions.169 The court opted for the good faith
test but injected language more appropriate for a negligence
standard:
[W] e hold that the obligation assumed by the insurer with respect to set-
tlement is to exercise good faith in dealing with offers of compromise, hav-
ing both its own and the insured's interests in mind. And it may be said
also that a reasonably diligent effort must be made to ascertain the facts
upon which a good faith judgment as to settlement can be formulated. 1 7 0
Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in the landmark case of
Hilker v. Western Automobile Insurance Co.,171 defined good faith
in negligence terms:
[T]he good-faith performance of the obligation [to consider fairly settle-
ment demands against its insured] which the insurance company as-
sumed when it took to itself the complete and exclusive control of all
matters that determine the liability of the insured, requires that it be held
to that degree of care and diligence which a man of ordinary care and pru-
dence would exercise in the management of his own business were he
investigating and adjusting such claims. 1 72
A number of jurisdictions have attempted to avoid this seman-
tic wrangle by adopting the negligence standard as alternative or
additional to the bad faith standard. Thus, the Oregon Court of
Appeals, in Kriz v. Government Employees Insurance Co.,173 stated
that excess liability may be imposed upon an insurer I the in-
surer has failed, negligently or in bad faith, to settle the claim
against the insured." Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in General Casualty Co. v. Wipple,174 stated that "negligence
or bad faith is the Illinois standard of conduct to be applied to the
facts"'7 5 to determine excess liability.
Other courts, however, in rejecting negligence as a standard for
imposition of excess liability have sought to distinguish negligence
from bad faith in terms of culpability. Thus, in upholding the dis-
missal of a claim for negligent failure to settle within policy limits,
a California court of appeal, in Merritt v. Reserve Insurance Co.176
stated:
169. Id. at 303, 157 A.2d at 322 (court noted that Appleman had taken the position
that good faith was giving way to negligence as the majority standard but an
annotation at 40 A.L.R.2d 168, 178 had taken the position that good faith was
the standard used "[i]n the great majority of the cases.") Our research con-
vinces us that the view stated in the annotation is the correct one.
170. 31 NJ. at 304, 157 A.2d at 322.
171. 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1931).
172. Id. at 10, 231 N.W. at 261.
173. 42 Or. App. 339,343,600 P.2d 496,500. The court remanded the case for consid-
eration of the factual issue of whether the insurer had a reasonable opportu-
nity to settle.
174. 328 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1964).
175. Id. at 355.
176. 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973).
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With respect to the first charge, negligent failure to initiate settlement
discussions, we have seen from our review of the California cases that ac-
tionable failure to settle must encompass bad faith, that negligence alone
is insufficient to support the charge. As the court said in rejecting the neg-
ligence test in Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 688, 319
P.2d 69, 74, "[t] o justify such a result [liability in excess of policy limits]
requires substantial culpability on the part of the insurer-bad faith
rather than mere negligence.., negligence albne is insufficient to render
the insurer liable." 177
Even in those jurisdictions which reject negligence as the ap-
propriate standard, it may be considered in connection with the
issue of whether the insurer's refusal to settle was a breach of its
duty of good faith and fair dealing. Thus, the Florida Supreme
Court recently noted: "Because the duty of good faith involves dil-
igence and care in the investigation and evaluation of the claim
against the insured, negligence is relevant to the question of good
faith."178 Indeed, where the negligence has been repeated or per-
vasive, the court may find that such slipshod handling of the in-
sured's case constituted bad faith on the part of the insurer.IV9
Courts which have adopted negligence as the appropriate stan-
dard for imposition of excess liability have relied on the theory
that the insurer, having contractually reserved the right to defend
and settle cases against the insured, has a duty to exercise its right
to settle and perform its duty to defend with due care. As one
court stated:
[The insurer] contracted to take charge of the defense of this claim. That
contract created a relation out of which grew the duty to use care when
action was taken. The insurer entered upon the conduct of the affair in
question. It had and exercised authority over the matter in every respect,
even to.negotiating for a settlement. It is difficult to see upon what ground
it could escape responsibility when its negligence resulted in damage to
the party it had contracted to serve.180
The negligence standard has long been criticized because, in
many cases, it would penalize the insurer for an inaccurate predic-
tion on an inherently unpredictable topic-a likely jury verdict.
This point was rather colorfully made by the Kentucky Supreme
Court in Georgia Casualty Co. v. Mann:18l
The gift of prophecy has never been bestowed on ordinary mortals, and as
yet their vision has not reached such a state of perfection that they have
the power to predict what will be the verdict of the jury on disputed facts
in a personal injury case.... Calling it negligence for an agent not to
divine what would be the result of a jury trial on disputed evidence, per-
177. Id. at 880, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 526.
178. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. 1980).
179. Yeomans v. Allstate Ins. Co., 121 N.J. Super. 96, 296 A.2d 96 (1972).
180. Douglas v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 376, 127 A. 708, 711
(1924).
181. 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932).
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mitting a jury to determine the question not solely on the facts as
presented to him, but in the light of the subsequent verdict of the jury,
would carry his responsibility beyond the bounds of reason and further
than the demands of justice require.18 2
Two further points should be noted with respect to the negli-
gence standard for the imposition of excess liability. First, in most
jurisdictions applying this standard, the test is not whether the in-
surer acted as a reasonable average man would have done in the
face of the settlement demand. Rather, most jurisdictions take
into account the expertise of the insurer in handling and settling
claims and, accordingly, hold the insurer to a higher standard of
care consistent with this expertise.183 Second, some jurisdictions
have tempered the effect of the negligence rule by imposing a
higher burden of proof upon the claimant or the insured, stating
that "the breach of the insurer's duty must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence."184
4. Strict Liability as the Suggested Standard for Imposition
of Excess Liability
Several cases' 85 and numerous commentators 186 have sug-
gested that strict liability should be imposed upon an insurer who
refuses a demand that the claim against its insured be settled
within policy limits. Under such a standard, the insurer would be
liable for whatever verdict might be returned against its insured
following such a refusal, without regard to its due care or good
faith in the handling and defense of the claim against its insured.
182. Id. at 451-52, 46 S.W.2d at 779-80.
183. See 7C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 4, § 4713 and cases cited therein at note 1.
The expertise of an insurer may even be considered in good faith jurisdic-
tions. See, e.g., Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 51 N.J. 62, 237 A.2d 857
(1968). Other factors to be considered in negligence cases are set forth in
Globe Indem. Co. v. Gen-Aero, Inc., 459 S.W.2d 205 (Tex Civ. App. 1970).
184. Alt v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 340, 354, 237 N.W.2d 706, 714-15
(1976). In addition, at least one court has held that liability for negligence
cannot be imposed without proof of an unconditional offer to settle by the
third-party claimant. Danner v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 340 F.2d 427 (5th Cir.
1964). In Danner, the court held that the insurer was not negligent in failing
to accept a conditional settlement offer.
185. Johansen v. California State Auto. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 15 Cal. 3d 9,538 P.2d 744,
123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,426 P.2d 173,
58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 NJ.
474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974); Alt v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 71 Wis. 2d 340,
237 N.W. 2d 706 (1976).
186. See Comment, supra note 10; Comment, Approaching Strict Liability of In-
surer for Ref.ring To Settle Within Policy Limits, 47 NEB. L. REV. 705 (1968).
Such approval is not universal, however, and strict liability has been re-
garded unfavorably by some leading commentators. See Keeton, Liability In-
surance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HArv. L. RE V. 1136 (1954).
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Three jurisdictions, California, New Jersey, and Wisconsin, are
generally cited as having either suggested or actually adopted a
strict liability standard. Careful review of the cases in those juris-
dictions reveals, however, that none of them have actually adopted
the proposed strict liability standard.
The strict liability standard seems to have first been suggested
by the California Supreme Court in Crisci v. Security Insurance
Co.187 In that case, the insurer's arbitrary and unreasonable re-
fusal to settle resulted not only in an excess verdict against its in-
sured, but also in the forced sale of her house to satisfy the
judgment. The supreme court upheld the trial court's determina-
tion that the insurer was liable for the entire amount of the verdict
against the insured because it failed to give as much consideration
to the financial interests of its insured as it gave to its own, even
though the insurer knew that there was considerable risk of sub-
stantial recovery beyond the policy limits. In addition, the court
upheld an award of substantial damages to the insured for her
mental suffering occasioned by the forced sale of her house.
Amicus curiae argued that a strict liability standard should be
187. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). The theory appears to have
been most recently considered in Shearer v. Reed, - Pa. Super. -, 428 A.2d
635 (1981) in which the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld a determination
that an insurer was liable for the excess of an adverse verdict over its policy
limits because it had acted in bad faith in refusing an offer to settle for policy
limits. In so holding, however, the court considered adoption of a strict liabil-
ity standard:
In reaching our decision, we have not overlooked the possibility that
we should reexamine the good faith standard. We recognize, as
others have before us, that there is an inherent conflict of interest
between an insurance company and its insured once an offer to settle
within policy limits has been received. Whenever the insurance
company decides not to settle, it has, in effect, chosen its interests
over that of its insured's-and by terms of virtually all liability insur-
ance policies, including the one in this case, that decision is made
solely by the insurance company. If the company's guess is wrong,
but nevertheless satisfies the good faith standard, it is not the com-
pany, which made the decision, but the insured who suffers. We
need not discuss this peculiar situation at any length because others
have already done so very well. [citations omitted] In some of the
cases the courts have indicated that in a proper case they would con-
sider resolving the conflict between an insurance company and its
insured by adopting an automatic liability rule, that whenever the
company refused to offer its policy limit toward a settlement, it
would be liable for any excess verdict. [citations omitted] However,
in each of these cases the insurance company was found liable for
the excess verdict by application of the existing good faith standard,
and the court chose to leave any change in the law to a future day.
We shall do the same.
Id. at -, 428 A.2d at 639-40. The court in Shearer also noted, as our research
has disclosed, that no appellate decision has actually adopted the strict liabil-
ity rule.
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adopted by California and, indeed, the proposed rule was dis-
cussed at length, and favorably, in the opinion. Three reasons sup-
porting adoption of the rule were advanced by Justice Peters.
First, the rule was seen as consistent with the reasonable expecta-
tions of the insured that "a sum of money equal to the limits is
available and will be used so as to avoid liability on his part with
regard to any covered accident." 8 8
Second, strict liability was viewed as far simpler to apply than
the good faith test since it "avoids the burdens of a determination
whether a settlement offer within policy limits was reasonable."18 9
The third reason proposed by the supreme court focused on a bal-
ancing of the benefits and burdens involved in the decision to liti-
gate rather than settle. The court stated: "[T] here is more than a
small amount of elementary justice in a rule that would require
that, in this situation where the insurer's and insured's interests
necessarily conflict, the insurer, which may reap the benefits of its
determination not to settle, should also suffer the detriment of its
decision."190
Although noting that a number of commentators had urged
adoption of the strict liability standard and in spite of its own
favorable comments concerning the rule,191 the court decided that
in view of the clear bad faith of the insurer, it was unnecessary to
decide whether to adopt such a standard in the case before it.192
The proposed strict liability rule was discussed by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors In-
surance C0.193 In that case, Chief Justice Hughes discussed the
strict liability standard at length and quoted extensively from the
Crisci opinion. Again, however, the court stopped just short of ac-
tually adopting a strict liability standard, stating: "It is unneces-
sary in the instant case to embrace such an extended rule. But
since this Court as all other courts, seeks to prevent the law from
inflicting unjust results, it is not discordant with its obligation, to
foresee the probability or the possibility thereof."94
Apparently ignoring this paragraph of the Rova Farms opinion,
the California Supreme Court in Johansen v. California State Au-
tomobile Association Inter-Insurance Bureau,195 interpreted Rova
188. 66 Cal. 2d at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See comments and notes cited by the court at 66 Cal. 2d at 431, 426 P.2d at 177,
58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
192. Id. at 431-32, 426 P.2d at 177-78, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17-18.
193. 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).
194. Id. at 502, 323 A.2d at 503.
195. 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975). The court, in a footnote,
stated:
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Farms as adopting strict liability, but found it unnecessary to
adopt such a standard in the matter before it.
The New Jersey Supreme Court had an opportunity to further
clarify its stand on the strict liability issue in Fireman's Fund In-
surance Co. v. Security Insurance Co,196 discussed at length
above.197 In that case, the insurer argued rather ingeniously that
the insured should not have been allowed to settle the claim over
the insurer's objections because, under the strict liability standard
supposedly adopted in Rova Farms, the insurer would have been
liable for whatever verdict resulted from the insurer's refusal to
settle. This argument was flatly rejected:
Security's argument is bottomed on an erroneous interpretation of our
opinion in Rova Farms, supra. Contrary to what Security contends, Rova
did not eliminate "bad faith" as one of the factors to be proven where an
action is instituted by an insured against his insurer based on its refusal
to settle. Nor did we in Rova adopt a rule making the insurer "automati-
cally liable to the insured for the over the limit judgment." While the
opinion in Rova did suggest that it might be desirable "one day" to adopt
such a rule, it concluded that "it is unnecessary in the instant case to em-
brace such an extended rule", (65 N.J. at 502), and such a rule has never
been adopted.198
The final case which is sometimes cited as having adopted a
strict liability standard is the opinion of the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin in Alt v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.199 Al-
though that case did set forth an unusually high standard of good
faith, and posited negligence as an alternative ground of recovery,
it did not adopt a strict liability standard. The court held that there
was "an affirmative duty on the part of the insurance company to
compromise claims,"209 but did not hold that the insurer had a
Both plaintiff and amicus curiae on behalf of plaintiff urge that we
hold that whenever an insurer receives an offer to settle within policy
limits and rejects it, the insurer should be held liable in every case
for the amount of any final judgment. We note that the New Jersey
Supreme Court in a well reasoned opinion has adopted this rule.
(Rova Farms Resor, Inc.' v. Investors Ins. Co. of America (1974) 65
N.J. 474 [323 A.2d 495].) In light of our conclusion that defendant's
liability for the excess judgment may be predicated on its rejection of
a reasonable settlement offer, we need not resolve this issue.
Id. at 17 n.6, 538 P.2d at 749 n.6, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 293 n.6 (emphasis added).
196. 72 N.J. 63, 367 A.2d 864 (1976).
197. See notes 56-65 & accompanying text supra.
198. 72 N.J. at 70-71, 367 A.2d at 868.
199. 71 Wis. 2d 340, 237 N.W.2d 706 (1976).
200. Id. at 349, 237 N.W.2d at 712. The court cited Baker v. Northwestern Cas. Co.,
26 Wis. 2d 306, 132 N.W.2d 493 (1965), ag imposing "at least" three other affirm-
ative duties upon the insurer with respect to its insured:
It must make a diligent effort to ascertain the facts upon which only
an intelligent and good-faith judgment may be predicated. In addi-
tion, the insurance company has a duty to determine the probability
that recovery will exceed the indemnity and to make a full disclosure
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duty to settle a claim within its policy limits whenever possible.
Rather, the court's holding was of a more limited nature:
We hold... that in all cases involving a probable overage, an insur-
ance carrier must be circumspect in respect to all settlement overtures
which are not patently frivolous, whether they be legally binding offers or
not, at least in situations where it would be apparent to a reasonable in-
surer that excess liability was probable and liability almost certain.2 0 1
Indeed, this holding was tempered by the court's further comment
that although the insurer was liable for negligence, it was negli-
gence of a rather unique sort, "the breach of ordinary care in a
fiduciary relationship,"2 02 and, accordingly, the plaintiff would be
held to a higher burden of proof.
Thus, each court which has discussed possible adoption of a
strict liability standard for imposition of excess liability upon an
insurer which has refused to settle has stepped back from the
brink and has required some showing of fault as a condition to im-
position of such liability. Moreover, this approach of refusing to
adopt strict liability but punishing culpable conduct by the insurer
is followed by all jurisdictions. While no standard may be said to
be universal or even the clear majority standard, it is clear that all
jurisdictions will impose excess liability upon a showing of some
fault; no jurisdiction leaves an insurer free to refuse settlement of
a claim within its policy limits solely to further its own interests at
the expense of the insured.
B. Excess Carrier's Right to Recover Excess of Adverse Verdict Over
Settlement Demand from Primary Carrier Which Refused to
Settle Claim Against Their Joint Insured
Two factual situations may give rise to an action by an excess
carrier against a primary carrier for wrongful refusal to settle.
First, there may be a verdict against the insured in excess of pri-
mary limits, which follows a refusal by the primary carrier to settle
within such limits. Second, there may be a verdict in excess of a
settlement demand which was greater than primary limits, but
with respect to which the excess carrier was willing to contribute
the necessary amount over the primary limits and the primary car-
rier was unwilling to contribute its limits. In the event of either
type of verdict, of course, the excess carrier may argue that it has
to the insured so that the insured may protect himself to the extent
possible. Baker added a third duty, not previously stated in Wiscon-
sin cases-the responsibility of keeping the insured timely and ade-
quately informed of any offers of settlement from the claimant and of
the progress of any settlement negotiations.
71 Wis. 2d at 346-47, 237 N.W.2d at 711.
201. Id. at 353, 237 N.W.2d at 714.
202. Id. at 354, 237 N.W.2d at 714.
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been damaged by the refusal of the primary carrier to settle. In
the first type of verdict, the measure of damages will be the entire
excess of the verdict over the primary limits. In the second type of
verdict, the appropriate measure of damages would seem to be the
excess of the verdict over the amount for which the claim could
have been settled.
An excess carrier which brings suit against the primary carrier
to recover the damages allegedly occasioned by the primary's
wrongful refusal to settle will face the same basic hurdle as an ex-
cess carrier which attempts to settle the claim and then sue the
primary carrier for reimbursement-the lack of any contractual re-
lationship between excess and primary carriers.20 3 The right of an
excess carrier to recover its damages from a primary carrier which
has wrongfully refused to settle a claim against their joint insured
has been considered in several cases. A review of those cases
reveals a number of theories upon which recovery has been al-
lowed: (1) the theory that the excess carrier is equitably subro-
gated to the rights of the insured against the primary carrier;204
(2) the theory that the primary carrier owes a direct duty to the
excess carrier;205 (3) the theory that the excess carrier may pro-.
ceed by contractual subrogation;206 and (4) the theory that the pri-
mary carrier, the excess carrier, and the insured owe to each other
a triangular reciprocal duty to use due care in the handling and
settlement of claims against the insured.207
However, the liability of the primary carrier to the excess car-
rier for wrongful refusal to settle within primary limits is not uni-
versally accepted. Rather, some courts have specifically held that
the primary carrier owes no duty to the excess carrier which would
require it to settle within primary limits, and accordingly, cannot
be liable for failure to do so.208
With this general overview in mind, it is appropriate now to ex-
amine the various theories which have been adopted by jurisdic-
tions in allowing or disallowing recovery by an excess carrier
against a primary carrier for the damage occasioned by the latter's
wrongful refusal to settle.
203. See Section II.B. of the text supra.
204. See, e.g., American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. All Am. Bus Lines, Inc., 190 F.2d 234 (10th
Cir. 1951).
205. See, e.g., Estate of Penn v. Amalgamated Gen. Agencies, 148 N.J. Super. 419,
372 A.2d 1124 (1977).
206. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reserve Ins. Co., 116 N.H. 806, 373 A.2d 339 (1976).
207. See, e.g., Transit Cas. Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360
(1979), disapproved in part, Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912, 610 P.2d 1038, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980).
208. See, e.g., Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 102 Ariz.
518, 433 P.2d 966 (1967).
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1. Equitable Subrogation
Equitable subrogation was first employed as the means to
bridge the contractual gap between primary and excess carriers in
the landmark case of American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. All
American Bus Lines, Inc.20 9 In that case, the primary insurer,
American Fidelity, refused to settle within its policy limits a claim
arising out of an accident involving its insured, All American Bus
Lines. A verdict at trial resulted in a judgment in excess of the
primary limits. The case was settled, pending appeal of the action,
with the primary carrier contributing the limits of its policy, and
the excess carrier, Security Mutual Casualty Company, contribut-
ing the balance.
The excess insurer instituted an action against the primary in-
surer and obtained a judgment for the full amount it spent, indi-
rectly, in settling the action against the insured. This judgment
was upheld by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which rejected
the primary carrier's arguments that it owed no contractual duty to
the excess carrier and that a subrogation theory could not be used
by an insurance company discharging a debt in the performance of
its own obligation.21 0 Although not using the term directly, the
court clearly based its decision on the theory of equitable
subrogation:
[T]he equities between the two companies were not equal... American
was allegedly guilty of bad faith [refusal to settle] while Security was at
most guilty of breach of contract [by reimbursing the insured for satisfac-
tion of the settlement rather than directly funding same] . .. and... as
between the two, it would be just and equitable for American to bear the
loss occasioned by its own misconduct.2 11
The equitable subrogation theory first espoused in American
Fidelity & Casualty Co. has since been followed in other Tenth
Circuit decisions.21 2 In addition, this theory has gained wide-
spread acceptance and is now the theory employed by the majority
of jurisdictions allowing recovery by the excess carrier from the
primary. carrier for wrongful refusal to settle within primary lim-
its.213 The rationale underlying the employment of equitable sub-
209. 190 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1951).
210. Id. at 238.
211. Id.
212. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 285 F.2d 579 (10th Cir.
1960); St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Martin, 190 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1951).
213. Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1977); Peter v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347 (CD. Cal. 1974); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 102 Ariz. 518,433 P.2d 966 (1967); Continental Cas. Co.
v. Reserve Ins. Co. 307 Minn. 5,238 N.W.2d 862 (1976); Estate of Penn v. Amal-
gamated Gen. Agencies, 148 NJ. Super. 419,372 A.2d 1124 (1977); Western Pac.
Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 69 Wash. 2d 11, 416 P.2d 468 (1966).
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rogation as the means for allowing such recovery was perhaps best
set forth in Peter v. Travelers Insurance Co.214 The court cited a
riumber of "strong equitable and economic considerations" 215 sup-
porting its decision that the primary carrier was liable for the en-
tire judgment because of its wrongful refusal to settle within policy
limits. First, the primary carrier owed a contractual duty to its in-
sured to settle in good faith, and "this duty is not reduced merely
because of another contract between the insured and its excess
insurer."216 Second, the court found that allowing the excess car-
rier to recover against the primary carrier was consistent with in-
surance industry practice and did not impose an undue burden
upon the primary carrier. The court stated:
An insurance company's duty to act in good faith in settling claims
within its policy limits is well established and is reflected in its premiums.
That an excess insurer may recover from the primary for breach of duty
does not increase the duty or the liability of the primary. Under the doc-
trine of equitable subrogation, the duty owed an excess insurer is identi-
cal to that owed the insured. The excess will not be able to force the
primary into accepting any settlement which his duty to the insured
would not require accepting... In considering whether it will settle a
claim, the primary insurer may consider its own interests, but it must
equally consider the interests of the insured, which become the interests
of the excess insurer by subrogation.
2 1 7
Finally, the court cited the control which the primary carrier
alone maintains over defense and settlement as an additional fac-
tor in support of its holding. The court found that the actions of
the primary insurer had a significant impact on the excess insurer,
214. 375 F. Supp. 1347 (C.D. Cal. 1974). The court quoted the following list of ele-
ments for a cause of action for equitable subrogation:
'"The elements of an insurer's cause of action based upon equitable
subrogation are these: (1) The insured has suffered a loss for which
the party to be charged is liable, either because the latter is a wrong-
doer whose act or omission caused the loss or because he is legally
responsible to the insured for the loss caused by the wrongdoer;
(2) the insurer, in whole or in part, has compensated the insured for
the same loss for which the party to be charged is liable; (3) the in-
sured has an existing, assignable cause of action against the party to
be charged, which action the insured could have asserted for his own
benefit had he not been compensated for his loss by the insurer;
(4) the insurer has suffered damages caused by the act or omission
upon which the liability of the party to be charged depends; (5) jus-
tice requires that the loss should be entirely shifted from the insurer
to the party to be charged, whose equitable position is inferior to that
of the insurer; and (6) the insurer's damages are in a stated sum,
usually the amount it has paid to its insured, assuming the payment
was not voluntary and was reasonable."
Id. at 1350 (quoting Patent Scaffolding Co. v. William Simpson .Constr. Co.,
256 Cal. App. 2d 506, 509, 64 Cal. Rptr. 187, 190 (1967)).
215. 375 F. Supp. at 1350.
216. Id.
217. Id.
[Vol. 61:284
1982] RESOLUTION OF SETTLEMENT CONFLICTS 337
and if the primary insurer were relieved of its duty to accept rea-
sonable settlement offers because of the existence of excess insur-
ance, it would result in higher premiums by the excess insurer and
would reduce the incentive of the primary insurer to settle.21 8
A number of defenses commonly offered by primary carriers to
suits by excess carriers have been rejected by those jurisdictions
which follow the equitable subrogation theory of All American BuS
Lines and Peter. Thus, the defense that there is no contractual re-
lationship between the primary and excess carrier has been re-
jected. As one court stated:
This argument ignores equitable subrogation. Under that doctrine, it is
the duty of the insurer to the insured that is enforced, not an independent
duty to the excess insurer. . .. 'This right of the insurer against the
wrongdoer does not rest upon any relation of contract or of privity of
them, but arises out of the nature of a contract of insurance as a contract
of indemnity."2 19
The defense that subrogation cannot lie because the insured,
having been insulated from the excess judgment by the excess in-
surer, has suffered no damage, also has been rejected: "It is not a
prerequisite to equitable subrogation that the subrogor suffered
actual loss; it is required only that he would have suffered loss had
the subrogee not discharged the liability or paid the loss."220
Finally, the contention that the excess carrier's right of recov-
ery is barred by its own contributory negligence in failing to settle
the liability above primary limits has also been found wanting.
This defense was forwarded by the primary carrier in Vencill v.
Continental Casualty Co.,2 but was rejected on the ground that
the excess carrier had no duty to defend the insured and no duty
to contribute any sums under its policy until the primary carrier
had posted its full limits. The failure of the primary carrier to post
its full limits in settlement, then, is seen-as preventing the duty of
the excess carrier to contribute to such settlement from ever
arising.
One important point should be noted with respect to those
cases which approve the use of equitable subrogation in this area.
The cases are in general agreement that this mode of recovery
does not establish a separate duty owed by the primary carrier to
the excess carrier. Rather, equitable subrogation is employed as a
218. Id. at 1350-51.
219. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers' Ins. Group, 76 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 1050,
143 Cal. Rptr. 415,426 (1978) (quoting Offer v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 114,118,
228 P. 11, 13 (1924)).
220. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 1044, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
221. 433 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D. W. Va. 1977). The similar defense of failure to mitigate
damages has also been rejected. Continental Cas. Co. v. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co., 516 F. Supp. 384 (NO). Cal. 1981).
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means to allow the excess insurer to succeed to the duty owed by
the primary insurer to the insured. Thus, whether excess liability
will actually be imposed upon the primary carrier will depend
upon whether its conduct in refusing to settle violates the standard
established in the particular jurisdiction for imposition of excess
liability in a suit brought by the insured against its insurer.
2. Contractual Subrogation
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Reserve Insurance Co.,222 held that the excess carrier's right
of recovery against the primary carrier for wrongful refusal to set-
tle may be based upon the standard subrogation clause contained
in most insurance contracts. In that case, Allstate based its cause
of action against the primary carrier, Reserve, on alternative theo-
ries of contractual subrogation and negligence, arguing that Re-
serve owed a direct duty to use due care to protect Allstate's
interest as an excess carrier. Reserve's motion to dismiss was de-
nied by the trial court, and this ruling was upheld by the supreme
court. The supreme court rejected Allstate's direct duty theory,
and, although it noted that many other jurisdictions employed eq-
uitable subrogation in such matters, it approved Allstate's contrac-
tual subrogation theory as the appropriate means of recovery. The
court stated:
We perceive no relationship between the two insurers which would im-
pose directly upon Reserve a duty to exercise due care in regard to All-
state. We agree, however, that Allstate is entitled to bring an action
against Reserve on the basis of [the insured's] assignment clause. Other
courts have sustained the right of excess insurers to maintain an action
against the primary carrier under a theory of equitable subrogation. We
find it unnecessary to utilize a subrogation analysis in view of our rule
that tort claims of this sort are assignable as choses in action.223
It should be noted that the assignment in Allstate was not a spe-
cific and separate assignment to the excess insurer by the insured
of his rights against the primary carrier for wrongful refusal to set-
tle. Rather, the court viewed the standard subrogation clause in
the policy as automatically effecting an assignment of the insured's
cause of action to the excess insurer.
The court in Allstate, like the courts which have accepted the
equitable subrogation theory, rejected the argument that an action
by subrogation cannot lie because the insured has suffered no
damage. The court based its rejection of this argument on the fact
that, under New Hampshire law, the insured's cause of action
against the insurer for negligent failure to settle "is not dependent
222. 116 N.H. 806, 373 A.2d 339 (1976).
223. Id. at 808, 373 A.2d at 340.
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upon the insured's prior payment or the certainty of his future
payment of the judgment against him."224
3. Direct Duty Owed by Primary Carrier to Excess Carrier
The decision in Estate of Penn v. Amalgamated General Agen-
cies,22 5 may be interpreted as upholding the right of the excess
carrier to recover from the primary carrier upon the basis of a di-
rect duty owed by the primary to the excess. Indeed, the court
specifically held: "[T]he primary carrier owes to the excess carrier
the same positive duty to take the initiative and attempt to negoti-
ate a settlement within its policy limit that it owes to its as-
sured."226 The clarity of this holding is somewhat blurred,
however, by the fact that it was preceded by a lengthy quote from
Peter v. Travelers Insurance Co .227 concerning the doctrine of equi-
table subrogation.
An important distinction exists between the theories of equita-
ble subrogation and a direct duty owed by the primary to the ex-
cess. Under the theory of equitable subrogation, the excess
insurer succeeds to whatever rights the insured has against the
primary insurer. Unfortunately, under this theory, the rights of
the subrogee can never be greater than those of the subrogor. Ap-
plying that principle to an action by an excess carrier against a
primary carrier may produce inequitable results. Thus, if the pri-
mary carrier and the insured hive acted in collusion to improperly
reject settlement within the primary limits, such wrongful conduct
on the part of the insured would seem to bar the right of the excess
carrier to recover from the primary carrier by way of equitable
subrogation. f on the other hand, a direct duty is owed by the
primary to the excess, the insured's conduct would seem to pres-
ent no obstacle to the excess carrier's cause of action against the
primary carrier.2 2 This weakness in the equitable subrogation
doctrine led directly to the adoption of "triangular reciprocity" as
the means of allowing recovery by the excess carrier against the
primary carrier in Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp.229
224. Id.
225. 148 NJ. Super. 419, 372 A.2d 1124 (1977).
226. Id. at 424, 372 A.2d at 1127.
227. 375 F. Supp. 1347 (C.D. Cal. 1974). For a discussion of Peter, see notes 214-18 &
accompanying text supra.
228. See, e.g., Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. North Star Reinsurance Corp., 90 Cal. App.
3d 786, 153 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1979) (collusion between primary insurer and in-
sured will not be allowed to destroy rights of excess carier).
229. 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1979).
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4. Triangular Reciprocity
The existence of a triangular reciprocal duty of due care owing
between and among the insured, the primary carrier, and the ex-
cess carrier, was posited by the court of appeal in California in
Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp.230 as a basis for the excess
carrier's recovery against the primary carrier for wrongful refusal
to settle. Whether Transit Casualty has any continuing validity is
somewhat in doubt, however, in view of the express disapproval of
that opinion by the California Supreme Court insofar as it allowed
recovery against the insured and insofar as it allowed recovery for
negligent failure to settle.231
In Transit Casualty, the excess carrier, Transit Casualty, sued
both the insured engineering firm, Spink Corporation, and the pri-
mary carrier, American Reserve, for their allegedly wrongful re-
fusal to settle a claim within the substantial deductible of the
insured and the primary limits. At trial, the excess carrier was
awarded all of the sums it had spent in satisfaction of the excess
judgment and settlement of related claims, which sums were alleg-
edly inflated by the excess verdict in the trial of the first claim.
This judgment was appealed by both the insured and the primary
insurer.
In support of its appeal, the primary carrier argued that the ex-
cess carrier's right of recovery was defeated by the bad faith of the
insured in refusing to settle within the deductible and primary lim-
its. This argument was flatly rejected:
American's contention rests on the assumption that equitable subroga-
tion is a sine qua non of the excess insurer's suit. The assumption will not
survive analysis. Equitable subrogation is a descendant of historic equity
230. Id.
231. In Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912,
921, 610 P.2d 1038, 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 714 (1980), the California Supreme
Court, in rejecting the imposition of liability upon an insured for bad faith
refusal to settle, statedh
We observe that an apparently contrary conclusion has been
reached by the Third District in the recent case of Transit Casualty
Co. v. Spink Corp.... [We disapprove that case] insofar as it holds
that an insured's duty of good faith and fair dealing to his excess car-
rier compels him to accept a settlement offer or proceed at his peril
where there is a substantial likelihood that an adverse judgment will
bring excess insurance coverage into play.
For a discussion of Commercial Union, see notes 249-81 & accompanying text
infra.
However, in a more recent case, Signal Cos. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 3d
359, 365, 612 P.2d 889, 892-93, 165 Cal. Rptr. 799, 802-03 (1980), the California
Supreme Court quoted Transit Casualty at length, stating that Justice Paras
had "summarized very well, within the context of an action alleging a wrong-
ful refusal to settle, the relationship between excess and primary coverages"
and cited Transit Casualty as "disapproved in part in Commercial Union.
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practice; it is utilized as a device to achieve a just result by clothing a
party with a right of recovery when he would otherwise be defeated by
lack of privity. Tested as an indispensable element of the excess carrier's
claim, equitable subrogation fails to achieve even handed justice....
[The primary and excess carriers] [u] sually... have no contractual priv-
ity inter se. They are however, fully aware of their respective roles and of
the significant differences in their obligations to the insured .... When
an accident occurs, they become totally aware of each other. When the
settlement value of the injury hovers over the upper limit of primary cov-
erage, the two carriers face interacting problems of claim adjustment, set-
tlement and defense. Each has a choice of mutual support or naked self-
interest. The law, then, would be unrealistic in demanding that either car-
rier use the policyholder as its stepping stone to the assertion of a mutual
obligation to each other. Triangular reciprocity is far more rational.232
The triangular reciprocal duty of due care was also seen as pro-
moting the "sharing of the loss according to the measure of each
party's comparative fault."233 The court analyzed the relationship
among insured, primary insurer, and excess insurer and saw impo-
sition of triangular reciprocity as consistent with the nature of that
relationship in a settlement context. The court stated:
The three-way duty concept harmonizes with settlement realities. The
policyholder pays for two kinds of liability coverage, each at a different
rate. The premium charged by the primary insurer supports more local-
ized claims adjustment facilities than those of the excess carrier. It takes
into account costs of defense, including legal fees, which the primary in-
surer normally provides. The excess carrier is less frequently confronted
with loss possibilities and, when it is, may employ local adjusters. The
primary insurer is assisted, not impeded, by the active participation of an-
other carrier with a stake in the negotiations. Self-interest will impel the
primary carrier to take the lead when settlement value is well within its
policy limits, the excess carrier when the claim invades its own policy ex-
posure. When settlement value hovers over the fringes of both policies,
both carriers may collaborate. Each may disagree with the settlement
sentiments of the other; agreement is more likely when each knows that a
jury may ultimately pass upon the reasonableness of its conduct. The pri-
mary carrier's conflict of interest with the excess carrier is no more acute
than its conflict with the policyholder without excess coverage. Either
may sue it for a bad faith refusal to settle. Neither carrier is likely to be
intransigent if both know that intransigence will be a factor for considera-
tion in a later refusal-to-settle lawsuit. Triangular reciprocity advances
the public interest in extrajudicial settlement.2 34
Finally, the court rejected the primary carrier's arguments that
the requirement that the insured consent to settle relieved the in-
surer of any obligation to settle and that the insured's refusal to
settle precluded settlement by the primary carrier. The court
noted that the settlement clause provided that the insured would
be liable for the excess of any verdict over a settlement amount
232. Transit Cas. Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 132-33, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360,
365 (1979).
233. Id. at 134, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 366-67.
234. Id. at 135, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
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recommended by the insurer and opposed by the insured and
viewed this clause as giving the insurer substantial power to pres-
sure the insured into settlement.235 In addition, the court rejected
the argument that the insured's refusal to consent to settlement
was the sole cause of the excess carrier's loss. Such an argument,
the court stated, "ignores the elementary proposition that a tor-
tious injury may result from two independently concurring
causes."
23 6
5. Cases Disallowing Recovery
The trend toward allowing the excess carrier to recover the
damages occasioned by the primary carrier's refusal to settle
within its limits is not universal. Rather, two cases applying Ari-
zona law clearly and specifically rejected such a cause of action. In
Universal Underwri ers Insurance Co. v. Dairyland Mutual Insur-
ance Co.,237 the Arizona Supreme Court, in a six paragraph opin-
ion, summarily rejected the argument of the excess carrier,
Universal, that it should be entitled to recover its damages occa-
sioned by the wrongful refusal of the primary carrier, Dairyland, to
settle the claim against their joint insured within primary limits.
The court stated:
Without doubt Dairyland owed good faith to its insured, which may or
may not have been here exercised, a question we find unnecessary to an-
swer. There is no privy of contract between these two insurance compa-
nies nor is there any principle of law of which we are aware that would
give Universal such a windfall because of Dairyland's mistreatment of its
assured.2 3 8
Thus, the court limited recovery by the excess carrier, which had
defended the insured and settled the judgment against it following
the refusal of the primary carrier to do so, to the primary carrier's
limits of coverage.
In a more recent case involving an excess insurer against the
same primary carrier, Rocky Mountain Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Dairyland Insurance Co., 239 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that it was required, under Universal Underwriters, to affirm
the judgment for the primary carrier because that opinion pre-
cluded an action under a theory of either equitable subrogation or
breach of a direct duty between primary and excess insurers.
One point should be noted with respect to both the Universal
Underwriters and the Rocky Mountain cases. In each case, the
235. Id. at 137, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
236. Id.
237. 102 Ariz. 518, 433 P.2d 966 (1967).
238. Id. at 520, 433 P.2d at 968.
239. 452 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1971).
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primary and excess relationship did not arise by the specific de-
sign of the insured. Rather, each case involved an automobile acci-
dent in which the driver who was a defendant in the personal
injury action was driving a borrowed car. In such circumstances,
the owner's policy provided the primary coverage and the driver's
carrier, by coincidence, provided the excess coverage. Thus, it was
sheer happenstance that the two carriers came to enjoy a primary
and excess relationship inter se. It is not altogether clear whether
the Arizona courts would hold that a primary carrier has no duty to
the excess carrier when it provided a specific primary coverage
and was aware that the insured had also purchased excess cover-
age from carriers which would be relying on the primary to prop-
erly handle, defend, and settle claims below the threshold limits of
their coverage.
C. Insurer's Right to Recover Excess of Verdict Over Settlement
Demand from Insured Which Refused to Give Required
Consent or to Post Necessary Sums Under Deductible,
Self-Insured Retention, or Participation Provisions
of its Coverage.
As has been noted,240 many of today's policies contain one or
more of the four following features which give the insured substan-
tial control over settlement: (1) a clause requiring that the consent
of the insured be obtained to any proposed settlement; (2) a sub-
stantial deductible; (3) a large self-insured retention; and (4) a
participation in one or more layers of coverage. The insured's ex-
ercise of the power granted to it by one or more of these clauses to
block settlement may, of course, result in an adverse verdict sub-
stantially higher than the proposed settlement. The question then
arises whether the insurer which is forced to pay a greater amount
in satisfaction or settlement of the adverse verdict than it would
have had to pay in settlement prior to such verdict may recover the
excess from the insured.
Extensive re.search has revealed only two cases in which this
issue has been resolved, and the results therein are diametrically
opposed. In Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp., 241 the court of
appeal of California held that the excess carrier could recover
damages from the insured-for its wrongful refusal to settle. How-
ever, in a later case, Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway
Stores, Inc.,242 the California Supreme Court disapproved this as-
240. See text accompanying notes 104-09 supra.
241. 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1979). See notes 230-36 supra for a
discussion of the court's holding that the excess carrier could recover dam-
ages from the primary carrier for its wrongful refusal to settle.
242. 26 Cal. 3d 912, 610 P.2d 1038, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980).
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pect of Transit Casualty and held that, in ordinary circumstances,
the insured could not be held to a duty to effect settlement below
the threshold limits of excess coverage either under a theory of
negligence 243 or under its duty of good faith and fair dealing. An
examination and comparison of the two cases suggests, however,
that the Transit Casualty opinion is better reasoned and that the
Commercial Union decision is unsound and should not be fol-
lowed by other jurisdictions.
In Transit Casualty, Spink, an engineering company, was sued
in connection with the cave-in of a trench upon which it had
worked. The cave-in resulted in the death of one workman and in-
jury to several others. The heirs of the deceased worker filed a
wrongful death suit against five different defendants, including
Spink. Spink maintained a $100,000 professional liability policy
with American Motorists, the primary carrier, which contained a
$15,000 deductible and provided for Spink's consent, in writing, to
any settlement proposal. Spink also had an excess policy with
Transit Casualty with limits of $1 million. The plaintiffs offered to
settle for $300,000, to be divided among the five defendants. Spink,
concerned about its future insurability, refused to consent to its
$76,000 share of the settlement and refused to post its deductible.
At trial, plaintiffs obtained a $632,000 verdict against Spink and
two other defendants. Spink was also held liable to one of these
other defendants on its cross complaint. In order to satisfy Spink's
liability, Spink paid $15,000, American Motorists paid $100,000, and
Transit Casualty paid $175,000. Thereafter, Transit Casualty con-
tributed an additional $285,000 toward settlement of the other per-
sonal injuries claims resulting from the trench collapse.
Transit Casualty then brought an action against Spink and
American Motorists, charging that their unwarranted refusal of
settlement had forced the first case to trial, resulting in the excess
judgment and escalating the settlement value of the remaining
cases. At this trial, the jury was instructed that the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing bound all three parties, includ-
ing the policyholder. The jury awarded Transit Casualty all sums
which it had to pay, not only in satisfaction of the adverse judg-
ment, but also in settlement of the personal injury claims. Both
Spink and American Motorists appealed the verdict.
The jury verdict was afirmed by the court of appeal in a lengthy
and well-reasoned opinion in which the court made two fundamen-
243. Id. at 921, 610 P.2d at 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 714. The court gave short shrift to
Commercial Union's negligence theory, noting that it also depended upon the
existence of a duty to settle which was not explicit in the policy and could not
be derived from the insured's implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
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tal holdings:244 (1) the insured's duty of good faith and fair dealing
requires it, in appropriate cases, to settle claims below the thresh-
old limits of the excess carrier's coverage; and (2) the duty of good
faith and fair dealing is not the only duty which exists between
insured, primary, and excess carriers; rather, each owes the other
a "triangular reciprocal duty of due care" and may be held liable
for breach of that duty. With respect to the first holding, the court
rejected any notion that the insured did not have any duty of good
faith and fair dealing, finding that this implied duty bound both
policyholder and insurer.2 45
The court also rejected Spink's argument that, even if it did
have a duty of good faith and fair dealing, such duty could not be
extended to include a duty to settle because of the "consent to set-
tlement" clause in its policy.248 The court noted the adverse effect
which acceptance of this argument would have on the public
interest:
There is however a public interest in extrajudicial settlement of law-
suits.... The settlement clause tends to defeat that interest and there-
fore will be narrowly construed so as not to defeat the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing which is an implied reciprocal term of the policy.
That covenant contemplates that neither party will injure unreasonably,
and certainly not arbitrarily, the right of the other to receive the benefit of
the agreement or to minimize a loss thereunder ...
Thus the settlement clause does not permit unreasonable rejection of
settlement by the insured. This circumscription does not divest the clause
of meaning. In a suit charging the policyholder with unreasonable refusal
to settle, the clause provides him with an opportunity to convince a jury or
judge that his refusal to agree to a settlement was reasonable under all the
circumstances, including his concern for professional reputation. The set-
tlement clause exhibits no inconsistency with the policyholder'* obliga-
tion of good faith.2 4 7
Thus, the court in Transit Casualty based its holding that the
insured may be liable for failure to settle claims below the thresh-
old limits of its excess coverage on three fundamental concepts:
(1) the triangular reciprocal duty of due care among insureds, pri-
mary, and excess insurers;2 48 (2) the reciprocal nature of the duty
244. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 134-36, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 366-67.
245. Id. at 131, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 364. The reciprocal nature of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing was recognized by the court in Commercial Union and the
cases cited therein. See Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912,918, 610 P.2d 1038, 1041,164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 712 (1980).
In addition, this rule was similar to that espoused in Sargent v. Johnson, 551
F.2d 221, 231-32 (8th Cir. 1977), in which the court stated that the insured and
insurer must "maintain a mutual respect for the interests of the other."
246. 94 Cal. App. 3d at 136, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
247. Id.
248. For a discussion of this triangular reciprocal duty, see notes 230-36 & accom-
panying text supra.
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of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) the public interest in extraju-
dicial settlement of litigation.
A comparison of the court's consideration of these concepts in
Transit Casualty with their treatment in Commercial Union Assur-
ance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc.249 compels the conclusion that
the reasoning and holding of the court in Transit Casualty clearly
represent the better view. The Transit Casualty decision is more
consistent with the California courts' interpretation of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing as a reciprocal obligation binding both
the insured and insurers,250 and with the public policy favoring ex-
trajudicial settlement of litigation.
In Commercial Union, Safeway Stores, Inc., the insured, had in-
surance with limits of $50,000 with Travelers Insurance Company
and Travelers Indemnity Company and was self-insured for liabil-
ity between the sums of $50,000 and $100,000. Commercial Union
Assurance Companies and Mission Insurance Company (conjunc-
tively referred to as Commercial in the opinion) provided insur-
ance coverage for Safeway's liability in excess of $100,000 to $20
million. One Hazel Callies recovered a judgment of $125,000
against Safeway. Thereafter, Commercial Union brought an action
against Safeway and Travelers, alleging negligence and breach of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing in their failure to settle the
Callies claim for $60,000 (or possibly even $50,000), when they had
the opportunity to do so and the knowledge that there was a possi-
ble and probable liability in excess of $100,000.
Safeway's demurrer to the complaint for failure to state a cause
of action was sustained, and Commercial Union was given twenty
days leave to amend. Following Commercial Union's failure to
amend the complaint, the action was dismissed as to Safeway. The
dismissal was affirmed by the court of appeal251 and then by the
California Supreme Court, which adopted the court of appeal's
opinion, with a few additions and deletions,25 2 as its own.
249. 26 Cal. 3d 912, 610 P.2d 1038, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980).
250. See, e.g., Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d
912, 610 P.2d 1038, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980); Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. North Star
Reinsurance Corp., 90 Cal. App. 3d 786, 153 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1979); Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Altflllisch Constr. Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 789, 139 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1977).
251. 96 Cal. App. 3d 449, 158 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1979).
252. 26 Cal. 3d at 915, 610 P.2d at 1039, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 710. The California Supreme
Court's deletion of the court of appeal's entire discussion of negligence, fol-
lowed by its rejection of the bad faith cause of action against the insured and
its later statement in Signal Cos. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 3d 359, 612 P.2d
889, 165 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1980), that Transit Casualty was only "disapproved in
part" in Commercial Union, id. at 365, 612 P.2d at 892, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 802,
leads one to wonder just which part of Transit Casualty was approved by the
supreme court. A plausible interpretation that draws some support both
from the supreme court's opinion in Commercial Union and Signal is that the
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It is interesting to note that the court in Commercial Union, like
the court in Transit Casualty, initially acknowledged that the duty
of good faith and fair dealing was "a two-way street,"253 i.e., recip-
rocal. However, the court immediately set about dividing this
duty, leaving the insurer's side of the street considerably wider
and more difficult to maintain than the insured's by eliminating
any duty to settle on the part of the insured, while acknowledging
the insurer's duty to settle.
In discussing whether the insured's duty of good faith and fair
dealing included the duty to settle cases below the threshold limits
of its excess coverage, the court focused upon two aspects of the
relationship between the excess insurer and the insured: (1) the
nature of the bargain struck between the insurer and the insured;
and (2) the legitimate expectations of the parties which arise from
the contract. However, the court seriously misconstrued both as-
pects of the relationship between the excess insurer and the in-
sured. This misinterpretation led it to a decision which is simply
wrong both as a matter of legal reasoning and as a matter of public
policy.
Turning first to the nature of the bargain between the excess
insurer and the insured, it is interesting to note that the court of
appeal in Commercial Union based its rejection of the Transit Cas-
ualty case, in part, on the latter court's supposed failure "to take
into account the disparity of bargaining power between insured
and insurer."25 4 Although this specific paragraph was deleted by
the supreme court, review of that court's opinion suggests that the
deletion was more editorial than philosophical. Thus, the supreme
court did not treat the dispute before it as one between two sophis-
ticated corporations of relatively equal bargaining strength.
Rather, the tone of the supreme court's opinion suggested that the
matter pitted an unsophisticated insured against an overbearing
insurer. A more accurate interpretation of the typical fact situa-
tion giving rise to suits such as Commercial Union suggests that it
is the courts in Commercial Union which have failed to accurately
assess the relative bargaining power of the insurers and insureds
in excess insurance situations.
Stated simply, courts dealing with excess insurance actions
brought by insurers against their insureds are not handling cases
involving simple and unsophisticated individual insureds, such as
supreme court approved only that part of Transit Casualty which allowed the
excess carrier to proceed, by way of equitable subrogation, against the pri-
mary carrier for wrongful refusal to settle. This, of course, is an exceedingly
small part of Transit Casualty.
253. 26 Cal. 3d at 918, 610 P.2d at 1041, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
254. 96 Cal. App. 3d at 459, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02.
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are found in the automobile accident cases giving rise to bad faith
claims by the insureds against their insurers. Rather, the courts
are faced with very large, powerful, and sophisticated insureds
whose bargaining power is at least equal to that of the insurers.
This contention is clearly reinforced by a consideration of the two
insureds involved in the two cases in which the issue of the in-
surer's ight to recovery against its insured arose. In Transit Casu-
alty, the insured, Spink, was a large engineering firm and in
Commercial Union, the insured, Safeway, was one of the largest
supermarket chains in the world.
The contention that the bargaining power of the insureds in ex-
cess insurance situations is at least equal to that of the excess in-
surers is further supported by examination of the excess
insurance policies. For example, an excess insurance policy may
contain page after page of special endorsements and conditions
specifically tailored to the desires and needs of the insured and
thus, may be appropriately referred to as a "manuscript policy."255
This situation, of course, is markedly different from the typical au-
tomobile insurance situation where the insured has been
presented with a form policy which he must either reject or accept
in toto. The courts are understandably more inclined to view
these contracts as virtually contracts of adhesion.256 Although the
disparity of bargaining power rationale has some merit in simple
individual insured vs. giant insurance company cases, it is simply
not applicable to excess insurance cases, such as Commercial
Union, where the insured's bargaining power is at least equal to if
not greater than that of the excess insurer.25 7
In addressing the "legitimate expectations of the parties which
arise from the contract,"2 8 the court in Commercial Union found
that, although the insured had a reasonable expectation that the
insurer would settle the claim within policy limits, the excess in-
surers had no such legitimate expectations. The court stated:
The essence of the implied covenant of good faith in insurance policies
is that "'neither party will do anything which injures the right of the other
to receive the benefits of the agreement."' (Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
255. See, e.g., the policies at issue in Signal Cos. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 3d 359,
612 P.2d 889, 165 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1980), which are discussed in greater detail in
the court of appeal's decision, in 97 Cal. App. 3d 750, 159 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1979).
256. The form nature of such policies has led to the adoption of a number of rules
for the protection of the insured, including the rules that coverage is broadly
construed, see, e.g., Mohn v. American Cas. Co., 458 Pa. 576, 326 A.2d 346
(1974), and exclusions are narrowly construed. Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Wells, 453 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Ala. 1978).
257. See, e.g., Brokers Title Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 610 F.2d 1174 (3d
Cir. 1979) (where parties of relatively equal bargaining power enter into in-
surance contract, it will not be treated as contract of adhesion).
258. 26 Cal. 3d at 918, 610 P.2d at 1041, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
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supra, 17 Cal. 3d at 940, quoting from Brown v. Superior Court (1949) 34
Cal. 2d 559, 564 [212 P.2d 878]). One of the most important benefits of a
maximum limit insurance policy is the assuranee that the company will
provide the insured with defense and indemnification for the purpose of
protecting him from liability. Accordingly, the insured has a legitimate
right to expect that the method of settlement within policy limits will be
employed in order to give him such protection.
No such expectations can be said to reasonably flow from an excess
insurer to its insured. The object of the excess insurance policy is to pro-
vide additional resources should the insured's liability surpass a specified
sum. The insured owes no duty to defend or indemnify the excess carrier;
hence, the carrier can possess no reasonable expectation that the insured
will accept a settlement offer as a means of "protecting" the carrier from
exposure. The protection of the insurer's pecuniary interest is simply not
the subject of the bargain.259
Here the court failed to make the fundamental distinction be-
tween a situation where the insured has only one layer of coverage
and that in which there is excess coverage, and the court com-
pounded this failure by inaccurately assessing the basic nature of
excess insurance. It may be true that where there is only one layer
of insurance the insurer has no reasonable right to expect that the
insured will settle claims out of its own pocket in order to protect
the insurer. However, it does not necessarily and logically follow,
as the court in Commercial Union seemed to assume, that an ex-
cess insurer has no legitimate expectation that the insured will
settle claims below the threshold limits of the excess coverage
where there is an opportunity to do so.
The fundamental nature of excess insurance is just what the
name implies-it is excess to other insurance and to the insured's
own deductible, retention, and participation. Viewed from the ex-
cess insurer's perspective, one of the most important benefits of an
excess policy is the full protection of the primary limits (including
any and all deductibles, retentions, and/or participations). Thus,
neither the insured nor the insurers expect that the excess carriers
will be required to step in and defend, settle, or satisfy judgments
of claims which can be settled or defended to judgment below the
threshold limits of the excess coverage. This contention is clearly
supported by the following facts: (1) premiums for excess insur-
ance are historically significantly lower than premiums for primary
insurance;260 (2) the excess policies at issue in Commercial Union
specifically required, as do all excess policies,2 61 that the insured
259. Id. at 918-19, 610 P.2d at 1041-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13.
260. For example, review of the court of appeal's opinion and the briefs filed in
Signal Cos. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 3d 359, 612 P.2d 889, 165 Cal. Rptr. 799
(1980), revealed that the primary carrier received $106,000 in premiums for
$25,000 in coverage whereas the excess carriers received approximately
$150,000 for $10 million in coverage.
261. See, e.g., Vencill v. Continental Cas. Co., 433 F. Supp. 1371 (S.D. W. Va. 1977)
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maintain primary insurance in specified amounts; and (3) the lim-
its of liability provisions of excess policies specifically provide that
the carrier will pay its limits in settlement or satisfaction of judg-
ments only after the primary limits have been exhausted.262 More-
over, under the law of California and other jurisdictions, the excess
carrier has no duty to settle claims until the primary carrier has
exhausted or posted its entire limits.263
The failure of the Commercial Union court to distinguish be-
tween cases involving one layer of coverage and those involving
specific excess insurance was highlighted in its focus upon the du-
ties to defend and indemnify as supporting its conclusion that the
excess carrier had no reasonable expectation that the insured
would accept a settlement offer below the threshold limits of the
excess coverage. Again, where there is no excess insurance, only
one carrier has the obligation to defend and indemnify. In such a
situation, the carrier must protect the insured and cannot reason-
ably expect the insured to settle cases out of his own pocket to
protect the insurer. Where, however, excess insurance is involved,
the situation is completely different. In such a case, the excess
carrier will usually not have any duty to defend and will have only
a limited duty to indemnify. Moreover, the insured and the pri-
mary will usually control the defense to the exclusion of the excess
carrier. Thus, to a very real extent, the excess carrier is at the
mercy of the primary and the insured and must depend on their
good faith and fair dealing in the defense and settlement of claims.
Although such a duty may not be considered a classic example
of a duty to indemnify, the insured does have a duty to maintain
primary insurance (including any deductible, retention, or partici-
pation thereunder) and, thus, to protect the excess carrier from
(court noted existence of such requirement in excess policy and construed
primary policy in such a way as to avoid "gap" between primary and excess
coverage); Signal Cos. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 3d 359, 612 P.2d 889, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 799 (1980) (court noted that excess policies required maintenance of
primary coverage but primary policies did not require maintenance of excess
coverage).
262. Vencilt v. Continental Cas. Co., 433 F. Supp. 1371, 1373 (S.D. W. Va. 1977); Sig-
nal Cos. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 3d 359, 362, 612 P.2d 889, 891, 165 Cal. Rptr.
799, 801 (1980).
263. Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292,296 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying Califor-
nia law). Cf. Offshore Logistics Servs., Inc. v. Arkwright-Boston Mfg. Mut.
Ins. Co., 639 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1981) (court refused to reduce excess liability
verdict against excess carrier, which had refused to settle, by amount of de-
ductible both because there was not proof that deductible was not paid and
because excess carrier received full credit for primary limits, including de-
ductible); Benroth v. Continental Cas. Co., 132 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. La. 1955)
(actual payment of limits by primary not required, it may be sufficient that
third-party claimant gives full credit for primary limits.)
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exposure below its limits. Implication of a duty on the part of the
insured to settle cases below the threshold limit of the excess cov-
erage is, then, logically concomitant not only to the insured's gen-
eral duty of good faith and fair dealing but also to its duty to
maintain primary insurance.
The court in Commercial Union completely missed the point
when it suggested that "[t] he object of the excess insurance policy
is to provide additional resources should the insured's liability sur-
pass a specified sum." 26 4 Although this statement, taken in the ab-
stract, may be true, it fails to address the fundamental issue of
whether the insured, as part of its duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing, is required to settle cases below the threshold limit of its ex-
cess coverage in order to prevent its liability from exceeding that
limit. Under the Commercial Union decision, the insured is enti-
tled to the benefit of the lower premiums which are paid for excess
insurance because such insurance does not take effect until a cer-
tain threshold limit of liability has been passed, but has no obliga-
tion to see to it that this limit is not passed. Such a holding is not
only inequitable and illogical, but squarely inconsistent with other
cases which have suggested that any benefit to be realized under
an insurance contract should not be a mere windfall but should be
accompanied by some burden undertaken in exchange. 265
Amazingly, the court in Commercial Union further bolstered its
conclusion that the insured had no duty to settle below the thresh-
old limit of excess coverage by describing excess insurance as a
carte blanche authorization to the insured to gamble with the in-
surer's money. The court stated:
'"The duty to settle is implied in law to protect the insured from expo-
sure to liability in excess of coverage as a result of the insurer's gamble-
on which only the insured might lose." (Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
supra, 17 Cal. 3d at p. 941). Similar considerations do not apply where the
situation is reversed. where the insured is fully covered by primary insur-
ance, the primary insurer is entitled to take control of the settlement ne-
gotiations and the insured is precluded from interfering therewith (see
Shapero v. Allstate Ins. Co., (1971) 14 Cal. App. 3d 433, 437-438 [92 Cal.
Rptr. 244], quoting from Ivy v. Pacific Automobile Ins. Co., (1958) 156 Cal.
App. 2d 652, 659-660 [320 P.2d 140]). Where, as here, the policyholder is
self-insured for an amount below the beginning of the excess insurance
coverage, he is gambling as much with his own money as with that of the
carrier. The crucial point is that the carrier has no legitimate expectation
that the insured will "'give at least as much consideration to the financial
well-being"' of the insurance company as he does to his "'own interests"'
(Shapero, supra, 14 Cal. App. 3d at p. 438), in considering whether to settle
for an amount below the excess policy coverage. In fact, the primary rea-
son excess insurance is purchased is to provide an available pool of money
264. 26 Cal. 3d at 919, 610 P.2d at 1041, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
265. See, e.g., Valentine v. Aetna Ins. Co., 564 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1977); Estate of
Penn v. Amalgamated Gen. Agencies, 148 N.J. Super. 419,372 A.2d 1124 (1977).
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in the event that the decision is made to take the gamble of litigating.2 6
6
In this single quote, the court misconstrued both the purpose of
excess insurance and the purpose of litigation. First, the purpose
of excess insurance is not to provide would-be gamblers with "an
available pool of money" with which to gamble. Rather, the pur-
pose of excess insurance is to protect the insured in the event of a
genuinely catastrophic loss. The catastrophe is the event insured
against, not the risk that the insured will take a case that can be
settled below the threshold limits of excess coverage and parlay it
into a monumental adverse verdict. The court in Commercial
Union ignored the facts, not only of the case before it, but also
those common to most specific excess insurance situations, when
it suggested that the insured is "gambling with his own money as
much as with that of the carrier." In Commercial Union, the total
amount of Safeway's self-insured retention was $50,000-a minimal
amount when compared with the $19.9 million in coverage pro-
vided by the excess carriers. Indeed, in almost every case, the
amount of excess coverage is vastly greater than both the primary
and any self-insured retention. It is simply not true, then, to sug-
gest that the insured is "gambling with his own money as much as
with that of the carrier" when the insured refuses an opportunity
to settle below the threshold limits of excess coverage.
More importantly, the Commercial Union court misconstrued
the purpose of litigation. Litigation is not, as the court seemed to
suggest, a game of chance to be engaged in by all who can afford
the risks (indeed, made all the more easily affordable by the
court's decision that the insured should be allowed to gamble with
the insurer's money). Rather, litigation is and traditionally has
been society's vehicle for the peaceful resolution of disputes. In
our current "superlitigious society,"267 courts have been veritably
inundated with a flood of litigation and have actively fostered,
wherever possible, extrajudicial'settlement of claims. The sugges-
tion in Commercial Union that insureds should be encouraged to
gamble with the excess carrier's money by litigating even cases
which can and should be settled runs directly counter to the public
interest in reserving the limited resources of the courts for resolu-
tion of cases which cannot be settled.268
The court in Commercial Union apparently overlooked entirely
the adverse effect which its decision would inevitably have on the
public interest in minimizing loss and spreading the risks of loss
through the means of insurance. If the Commercial Union holding
266. 26 Cal. 3d at 919, 610 P.2d at 1042, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
267. Kaiser Found. Hosps. v. North Star Reinsurance Corp., 90 Cal. App. 3d 786, 793
n.11, 153 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 n.11 (1979).
268. See note 124 & accompanying text supra.
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were to become the generally accepted rule and thus, insureds
were to have no duty to settle below the threshold limits of their
excess coverage, not only would there be a greater increase in the
number of cases which have to be tried, but also an inevitable in-
crease in verdicts which exceed the primary limits and thus must
be paid by excess carriers. In such a situation, as a matter of sim-
ple economics, either premiums would have to be increased or ex-
cess insurance would become unavailable. Either result would
have an adverse effect on the public interest in spreading the risk
of loss through reasonably affordable (and available) insurance.269
The final anomaly in Commercial Union is that it was decided
in a state which upholds the right of an excess carrier to proceed
against a primary carrier for bad faith refusal to settle a claim be-
low the threshold of excess coverage.2 70 If a jurisdiction allows an
excess carrier to proceed against a primary carrier absent a con-
tractual relationship271 and even absent the primary's knowledge
of the excess carrier's existence,272 then afortiori, it ought to allow
a suit for bad faith refusal to settle against an insured with which
the excess carrier does have a direct contractual relationship. This
is especially true where the insured has voluntarily assumed
financial obligations under that contract, which make it more akin
to a primary insurer than to a normal insured.
While the decision in Commercial Union must be interpreted
as requiring extraordinary circumstances, beyond the mere exist-
ence of the insurer/insured relationship, to justify imposition of a
duty to settle upon the insured, it does not absolutely preclude the
imposition of such a duty. Rather, there are at least three plausi-
ble arguments which may be made for the imposition of such a
duty.
First, it may be noted that in Commercial Union there was no
allegation of any conscious wrongdoing on the part of the insured
or any improper collusion between the insured and the primary
insurer. The court emphasized the absence of any such allegations
in distinguishing Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. North Star Rein-
269. The increase in premiums which would result from a rule which freed a party
to an insurance relationship from a duty to settle below the threshold limits
of excess coverage has been considered a factor weighing against the adop-
tion of such a rule by courts in the excess versus primary cases cited in note
125 supra.
270. See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 516 F. Supp.
384 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Peter v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 F. Supp. 1347 (C.D. Cal.
1974); Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers' Ins. Group, 76 Cal. App. 3d 1031,
143 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1978).
271. See Sections ILB. & HLB. of the text supra.
272. See, e.g., Western World Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 140 N.J. Super. 338, 356
A.2d 83 (1976).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
surance Corp.2 73 and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Altfillisch
Construction Co.,274 the two cases principally relied upon by Com-
mercial Union in support of its cause of action for bad faith against
Safeway.27 5 Nevertheless, the court approved the principle set
forth in those cases that the insured must act in good faith toward
its insurer:
We acknowledge that equity requires fair dealing between the parties
to an insurance contract. We view the Kaiser and Liberty cases as point-
ing up a recognition in the law that the insured status as such is not a
license for the insured to engage in unconscionable acts which would sub-
vert the legitimate rights and expectations of the excess insurance
carrier.2 7 6
Where the insured has engaged in willful wrongdoing or in collu-
sion with the primary to block settlement at the expense of the
excess carrier, it might be argued that such conduct constitutes an
attempt by the insured to use his status as "a license.., to engage
in unconscionable acts which would subvert the legitimate rights
and expectations of the excess insurance carrier"277 and, accord-
ingly, is actionable even under Commerical Union.
Second, it should be noted that the policy at issue in Commer-
cial Union did not specifically impose any duty upon the insured
to settle below the threshold of the excess coverage. Thus, Com-
mercial Union was forced to base its cause of action upon the im-
plied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Although the court
rejected this implied duty as a basis for a cause of action, it did not
rule out the possibility that an insured could be held liable for
breach of an express duty to settle:
If an excess carrier wishes to insulate itself from liability for an insured's
failure to accept what it deems to be a reasonable settlement offer, it may
do so by appropriate language in the policy. We hesitate, however, to read
into the policy obligations which are neither sought after nor contem-
plated by the parties.2 78
Finally, the court's repeated emphasis upon the "reasonable ex-
pectations" and "implied promises" of the parties to an insurance
contract suggests that it might impose a duty of settlement upon
an insured where it could be shown that the insured, in return for
lower premiums or for some other reason, impliedly promised and
the insurers reasonably expected that the insured would settle
claims below the threshold limits of the excess coverage. Indeed,
273. 90 Cal. App. 3d 786, 153 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1979).
274. 70 Cal. App. 3d 789, 139 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1977).
275. 26 Cal. 3d at 919-20, 610 P.2d at 1042-43, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 713-14.
276. Id. at 921, 610 P.2d at 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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this suggestion arises from the way in which the court stated the
central questions which were to be resolved:
In the instant case, whether Commercial could harbor any legitimate
expectation that its insured would settle a claim for less than the thresh-
old amount of the policy coverage must be determined in the light of what
the parties bargained for. The complaint makes no reference to any lan-
guage in the policy which would give rise to such expectation. We must
therefore ask the question: Did Safeway, when it purchased excess cover-
age, impliedly promise that it would take all reasonable steps to settle a
claim below the limits of Commercial's coverage so as to protect Commer-
cial from possible exposure? Further, did Commercial extend excess cov-
erage with the understanding and expectation that it would receive such
favorable treatment from Safeway under the policy?
2 7 9
It should be noted, however, that the court's own answer to these
questions ("We think not")280 and the reasons given in support of
that answer seem to severely diminish, if not altogether destroy,
any prospect that it would ever uphold a cause of action against
the insured for wrongful failure to settle based solely upon an im-
plied promise by the insured and the reasonable expectation of the
insurer that the insured would do so. This prognostication is bol-
stered by the fact that the court explicitly held that the mere exist-
ence of a self-insured retention and primary layer of coverage did
not imply a promise to settle within such retention and primary
limits. 281
Thus, although Commercial Union does not explicitly forever
foreclose the possibility that an insurer could successfully sue its
insured for wrongful refusal to settle, for all practical purposes it
seems to narrow any such suit to one based upon explicit language
in the policy of insurance. Such a narrow view of the relationship
between an insurer and an insured might be sound and equitable
in the context of a low-imit automobile liability policy, where the
insured is at a substantial disadvantage in terms of bargaining
power and has paid a standard premium in return for virtually no
financial involvement in protecting himself against risks up to the
limits of his coverage. However, applied to cases involving large,
sophisticated insureds who have bargaining power relatively equal
to that of the insurers and have received substantial reduction in
their premiums in return for retaining a substantial financial in-
volvement in protecting themselves against risk, the approach
taken by the court in Commerical Union is neither equitable nor
279. Id. at 920, 610 P.2d at 1042, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 921, 610 P.2d at 1043,164 Cal. Rptr. at 714. This holding seems to reveal a
basic lack of understanding of insurance industry practice and standards, in
stark contrast to Justice Paras' explanation of the relationship between in-
sured, primary insurer, and excess insurer in Transit Casualty, which was
specifically approved in Commercial Union. -
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just. Rather, the approach, analysis, and holding of the court in
Transit Casualty clearly represents the better view in allocating
the liability for an excess verdict in a dispute between a sophisti-
cated insured with a large deductible, retention, or participation
and its insurer and, accordingly, should be followed by other
jurisdictions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Resolution of settlement disputes among insureds, primary in-
surers, and excess insurers is perhaps the one field in the law in
which there is the greatest internal confusion in, and conflict
among, the various jurisdictions. For example: (1) there is a dis-
pute among two leading authorities as to whether negligence or
good faith is the majority standard for the imposition of excess lia-
bility upon an insurer for wrongful failure to settle a claim within
policy limits; 2 8 2 (2) there are cases which have discussed this split
and opted for the good faith standard but then proceeded to dis-
cuss the standard in terms more appropriate to a negligence stan-
dard283 and (3) one jurisdiction cited another jurisdiction as
having adopted strict liability, which was promptly followed by a
case in which the latter pointed out that it had not adopted such a
standard.284
Much of this conflict, of course, may be attributed to the feder-
alism of our common law system. Where close questions are in-
volved and persuasive arguments may be made for different
resolutions, as seems to be the case in the resolution of settlement
disputes, it is not surprising to find that different jurisdictions have
adopted differing standards. However, an additional factor con-
tributing to this confusion in, and conflict among, jurisdictions
seems to be a failure of some jurisdictions to recognize the
changes in the insurance industry which have rendered inapposite
or inappropriate some of the more strongly entrenched principles
of insurance law. In particular, of course, we speak of the failure of
some jurisdictions to distinguish between two types of insurance
disputes: (1) those which pit an unsophisticated individual in-
sured, with no financial involvement in his own protection and no
control over the litigation, against a large insurance company,
which has issued a standard form policy vesting virtual total con-
trol over litigation in the insurer; and (2) those which pit a large,
sophisticated insured with substantial bargaining power, control
over litigation, and financial involvement in its own protection
282. See note 169 supra.
283. See text accompanying notes 168-72 supra.
284. See text accompanying notes 195-98 supra.
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against an insurance company which has issued a policy with en-
dorsements specially tailored to the needs of the insured and has
granted a substantial reduction in premiums in return for the pro-
tection of an underlying deductible, self-insured, or participation
and/or primary limits.
Having reviewed all of these cases and conflicts, and knowing
full well that even opinions which have been expressed by noted
insurance law scholars have not received universal acceptance, 2 85
the authors nonetheless suggest three proposals which we believe
would bring more order and rationality to the resolution of settle-
ment disputes.
First, the duties imposed upon the parties to the insurance con-
tract should be truly reciprocal. When dealing with duties which
are imposed under the express terms of the contract and which are
not usually the same (such as the insurer's duty to defend and the
insured's duty to cooperate), the courts should interpret such
terms so as to make the duties of one party mirror or mesh with
the duties of the other. Where the duties arise by implication,
such as the duty of good faith and fair dealing, they should be truly
reciprocal, equally burdening all parties to the insurance relation-
ship. Courts should not nominally hold the duty of good faith and
fair dealing to be reciprocal, then place the overwhelming burden
of that duty upon the insurers and thus strip the term of all practi-
cal meaning as applied to the insured.
This proposal for reciprocity of duties among insureds and in-
surers, of course, may be expected to engender considerable con-
troversy. Thus, some jurisdictions will reject the proposal on the
ground that it places an unbearable and unwarranted burden on
the insured. However, that view, while possessing superficial plau-
sibility, simply ignores the realities of the types of situations in
which the necessity for its application will arise. The proposed
rule of reciprocity would place no additional burden upon simple
individual insureds, for which the courts profess appropriate solic-
itude. Disputes with such insureds, who have little or no control
over settlement and little or no financial involvement in settlement
or judgments within the upper limits of their coverage, do not re-
quire litigation by the insurer to protect its own interest. In the
event that a claim can be settled within policy limits, the insurer
can do so with or without the consent of the insured. In the event
that a claim cannot be settled for policy limits, the insurer, pro-
vided it is acting in good faith, can simply offer its limits to the
285. See, e.g., the treatment of Professor Keeton's views concerning unilateral set-
tlement by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Se-
curity Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 63, 367 A.2d 864 (1976), discussed in text accompanying
notes 56-65 & 196-98 supra.
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third-party claimant and, in the event of an excess verdict, fulfill its
obligations by paying those limits. 2 8 6
Where, however, the insured has retained substantial control
over, and financial involvement in, litigation or settlement of
claims against it, there is real need and justification for the rule of
reciprocity. In such cases, the insurer may well be at the mercy of
the insured and, accordingly, must rely on the good faith of the
insured. Moreover, imposing upon the insured duties which are
reciprocal of those placed upon the insurer is justified by many of
the same analyses which have been used to impose such duties
upon the insurer. First, the control over settlement analysis which
has been applied in some cases to impose the duty of good faith
and fair dealing upon insurers would seem equally applicable to
impose such a duty upon insureds who have such control. Second,
the benefit and burden analysis which has been used by some ju-
risdictions in support of the imposition of a duty of good faith and
fair dealing or in support of the suggested standard of strict liabil-
ity, would seem equally applicable to an insured who may reap the
benefit of his refusal to settle and, therefore, should be burdened
with the detriment if such refusal was wrongful. Third, the equal
consideration test which has been applied to impose a duty of good
faith and fair dealing upon insurers because they are, in essence,
gambling with the insured's money when they refuse to settle,
would seem equally applicable to impose such a duty upon an in-
sured who is gambling with the insurer's money by refusing to
settle.
Our second proposal in the area of settlement dispute resolu-
tion concerns the right of one party to a settlement dispute to set-
tle over the objections of another and obtain the financial
contribution required from the objector as though it had con-
sented. We believe such a right should subsist only where the ob-
jecting party has violated the express terms of the contract. Thus,
where the insured refuses to settle, the insurer should have the
right to settle and sue the insured for its deductible, self-insured
retention, or participation only where the insured's refusal to set-
tle is part of its overall refusal to cooperate and not merely a differ-
ence of opinion as to the advisability of settlement. Conversely,
where the insurer refuses to settle, the insured's right to sue for
reimbursement should be limited to those cases where the insurer
has refused to defend. In proposing such a standard, we do not
intend to encourage parties to resolve a settlement dispute by uni-
laterally effecting settlement with the third-party claimant.
286. See, e.g., Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1980)
(insurer who was prevented from settling claim by insured not liable for ex-
cess verdict).
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Rather, this suggestion stems from the reluctant realization that
there will be situations in which a unilateral settlement is the only
way the objecting party can effectively protect itself and limit its
exposure. Nonetheless, those circumstances are extremely lim-
ited, and the adoption of either a bad faith or a conditional defense
standard for determining the propriety of unilateral settlement
would be unwarranted and unwise.
With respect to the bad faith standard for unilateral settlement,
the authors are in substantial agreement with the opinions ex-
pressed by Justice Clifford in his dissent in Fireman's Fund Insur-
ance Co. v. Security Insurance Co.287 Thus, we believe that
adoption of this standard is unwarranted because it deprives the
objecting party of any opportunity to obtain a judgment more
favorable than the settlement demand and yet provides no real ad-
ditional protection to the party seeking settlement. The party
seeking settlement is already fully protected by the fact that if the
objecting party's refusal to settle is in bad faith (as it would have
to be for unilateral settlement to be upheld under the bad faith
standard), that party will be liable for the entire excess of the ver-
dict over the settlement amount in any event.
An additional objection to the bad faith standard arises from
the amorphous nature of the concept. Courts have had considera-
ble difficulty establishing guidelines for the determination of bad
faith, even in cases where the claim against the insured has gone
to a verdict. While not conclusive, the verdict is at least some indi-
cation of the value of the claim and, hence, the good faith of the
party rejecting the settlement demand. The difficulty in determin-
ing bad faith can only be compounded where there is no verdict
and, accordingly, the likely outcome of a trial against the insured
would be a subject of sheer speculation.
The authors disapprove of the conditional defense standard for
the right of unilateral settlement because it exacerbates the very
problem which it is supposed to resolve. Requiring the insurer at
the outset of litigation to either waive any reservation of rights and
accept coverage or turn over complete control of defense and set-
tlement to the insured takes a potential conflict concerning cover-
age, which may never need to be resolved,288 and turns it into a
confrontation which must be resolved before many of the facts
287. 72 N.J. 63,367 A.2d 864 (1976). For a discussion of this case, see text accompa-
nying notes 56-65 supra.
288. If the case is settled by the joint agreement of insured and insurer, results in
a verdict favorable to the insured, or results in an adverse verdict on a ground
clearly within or without coverage, the dispute may become moot. Another
way of avoiding immediate confrontation, of course, would be to settle or liti-
gate subject to the outcome of a declaratory judgment.
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bearing on its resolution are even discovered. This all or nothing
approach is unwarranted. Rather, a better solution would be to al-
low the insurer to continue to defend under a reservation of rights.
In the event that the insured is not satisfied with the counsel se-
lected by the insurance company, it would seem appropriate, as
the Alaska Supreme Court suggested in Continental Insurance Co.
v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc. ,289 to allow the insured to choose its own
counsel, which would nonetheless be paid by the insurer.
Finally, we propose that good faith ought to be the standard by
which imposition of liability for the excess of an adverse verdict
over the settlement demand is determined. This recommendation
is based as much on the flaws of the negligence and strict liability
standards as upon the propriety of the good faith standard. With
respect to the negligence standard, the authors agree with the col-
orful criticism of that standard by the Kentucky Supreme Court290
as requiring gifts of prophecy which mere mortals do not possess,
especially when the object of such prophecy is inherently unpre-
dictable. Obviously, taking the element of fault out of such a pre-
diction altogether and imposing a strict liability standard only
serves to increase the injustice done to the party whose prediction
was incorrect.
The authors realize that in suggesting a good faith standard, we
are advocating further use of a term which has already caused con-
siderable confusion. The appropriate definitional test for that
standard should be whether the party (insured or insurer) ob-
jecting to settlement has made such objections after "equal consid-
eration" of the interests of the other.291 Such a test more
appropriately carries out the principle of reciprocity and is far su-
perior to the working definition of good faith employed by some
jurisdictions, which simply requires the insurer to sacrifice its le-
gitimate interests on behalf of the insured at the altar of good
faith.292
We realize that even the length of this Article has not been suf-
ficient to address every problem which may arise in settlement dis-
putes among insureds, primary insurers, and excess insurers.
However, the cases analyzed reflect the current state of the law
with respect to the more basic types of disputes. The proposals
outlined above, if adopted by the courts in resolving such problems
in the future, would lead to greater clarity in the law and a more
rational basis for conduct of the relationship between insured and
insurer in settlement disputes.
289. 608 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1980).
290. See quote in text accompanying note 182 supra.
291. See text accompanying notes 152-54 supra.
292. See text accompanying notes 155-66 supra.
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